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Let's All Join In: Intervention
Under Federal Rule 24'
By JoHN E. KENNEDY"
I. THE PROBLEM
The adversary system assumes that the parties have the power
to control their own litigation. The plaintiff is given all the impor-
tant initial powers such as naming the court, the parties, and the
theory of the case. The named party defendant then has a variety
of powers to change the parties to the controversy as orginally
structured by the plaintiff. Among his moves, the defendant may
use Rules 17, 19, 14 or 25 to force joinder of additional plaintiffs
and defendants, or third party defendants, or to substitute parties.
These powers of the plaintiff and the defendant to control the
parties to the litigation are overriden to some extent by the
power of the court to impose its will against the wishes of both the
existing parties. Under Rule 19, for example, the court may, on
its own motion, order non-parties to be brought in,' or under
Rule 42, sever or consolidate actions even though both parties may
resist.2 However, consider the status of a non-party who feels that
the outcome of the litigation will affect his interests, but who has
been excluded by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the court. What
0 This article is based in part on the author's co-revision with Professor James
W. Moore of Chapter 24 of Moore's Federal Practice, to be published in the spring
of 1969. The article and its conclusions are also based in part on a thesis to be
submitted by the author to the Yale Law School in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the J.S.D. degree. Related articles appear in Kennedy, Federal
Rule 17(a): Will the Real Party In Interest Please Stand? 51 MINN. L. REV. 675
(1967), and Kennedy, Federal Rule 17(b) and (c): Qualifying to Litigate in
Federal Court, 43 NO=aE DAmm LAw. 273 (1968).
0* LL.B, Notre Dame (1959); LL.M., Yale (1964); Associate Professor of
Law, University of Kentucky.
1At least, the trial or appellate court on its own motion may object to the
absence of an indispensable party, and presumably therefore under Rule 19 should
be able to order a party brought in over the objection of both parties. See 3 J.
Moon, FEDmiAL PRACTICE I19.051l] (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MooRn].2 See Schwartz, Severance-A Means of Minimizing the Role of Burden and
Expense in Determining the Outcome of Litigation, 20 VAlN. L. REv. 1197
(1967).
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are his rights of entry? The process of answering this question
results in a four-way clash of interests among the plaintiff, the
defendant, the court and the proposed intervener. The resolution
of this conflict is made under Federal Rule 24.
II. GENERAL OBJECTIVES IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM
The interests of the initial parties to the law suit should be
protected. These parties are bearing the litigation expense, in-
cluding time, trial costs, and attorneys' fees. Their attorneys'
choices regarding the scope of the controversy, especially their
strategies pertaining to discovery, settlement, presentation, and
appeal should be respected.
The interest of the intervener should be weighed against the
availability of other adequate remedies open to him. The general
objective here is a restatement of the theory that equitable re-
medies should be granted only where no adequate remedy exists
at law. As evolved in modern context under the merger of law
and equity, this general objective means that, in choosing whether
to allow intervention, the court should consider what alternative
remedies a petitioning intervener will have if the court rejects
his petition.
The interests of the trial and appellate courts should be pro-
tected by promoting sound policies of judicial administration. In
addition to facilitating the settlement process, other components
of this objective are efficiency, speed, accuracy, and the avoidance
of a multiplicity of law suits.3 In intervention situations, the trial
court must decide whether the totality of these components will
be served in the long run by a more complex litigation now, or
by rejecting intervention and thus promoting a second law suit
at a later date.4 The appellate courts must consider all the same
3 See reference to various judicial administration policies at note 178 infra.
Another set of interests and objectives that should be recognized are those of
the attorneys. Their legitimate interests in fees and avoiding conflicts of interests
should be promoted, but also regulated by the court. The court must also make a
realistic appraisal of the attorney's strategical objectives in making applications for
intervention. Some are made under conditions which might make them "sham,"
"collusive," "dilatory," "harassing," or a device for settlement leverage. Others
may be related to such various obiectives as by-passing jurisdictional barriers,
creating new remedies, presenting claims or defenses unavailable to the original
parties, or improving representation of interest.
4In making the choice between one complex litigation against two separate
litigations, it must also be recognized that the manner of deciding disputes has
(Continued on next page)
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objectives, and in addition, must determine the appropriate time
for allowing appellate interference with the trial judge's decision,
and the proper balance of power in reversing his decisionsY
The interest of political entities in restricting or limiting the
scope of controversies must be given effect. Consistent with the
United States Constitution, the federal court must give effect to
general congressional mandates on diversity and federal question
jurisdiction and must honor the interests of States under the
Erie doctrine. In given legislative areas, the federal court must
also interpret the specific will of Congress as to the scope of
controversy it wishes to allow.
Maximization of all interests should be favored over the flat
rejection of any one interest. Here a court should consider the pos-
sibility of using or creating types of limited intervention, ana-
logous to the types of discretionary devices developed in handling
multiple party and complex litigation in other areas, as alternatives
to the rigid absolutes of total intervention or non-intervention. In
appellate situations, the court should consider mechanisms for
allowing appeals on the merits of intervention while simul-
taneously allowing the trial to move forward. 6
III. RunE 24: AN ATTEMPT TO REGULATE THE RESOLUTION
A. Rule 24 of 1938
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules does not explicitly treat inter-
vention in terms of the five general objectives laid down in the
previous section. Rather, the language of the present Rule 24
evolved as a response to historical situations most often giving
rise to the need for intervention. Rule 24 of 1938, in addition to
recognizing statutory rights to intervene, categorized three such
situations.
The most obvious case for total intervention was one where
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
real impact on the ultimate result; i.e., intervention or non-intervention will effect
expenses, time, the settlement process, efficiency, and ultimately, the quality of
decision. See Professor Schwartz's proposal for regulating severance, supra note 2,
at 1208. See also Lederleitner & Nolan, Criteria for Intervention, 1967 U. ILL.
L.F. 299, 304.
5 See note 178 infra.
6 These ideas of "limited intervention" and simultaneous appeal have been
developed in Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies
and Arbitrators, 81 HAnv. L. REv. 721 (1968). See also discussion of factors
weighing against denial of intervention in note 38 infra.
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the action was in the nature of an in rem proceeding disposing
of claims to property. Here the non-party's interest in the property
would be legally or practically cut off if he was not let in at the
original proceeding. The evolution of this situation resulted in
Rule 24 (a) (3) of 1938:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone
shall be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (3) when
the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof.7
7 A 1946 amendment expanded the concept of court "custody" to include
cases where property was subject to the "control or disposition" of the court. See
Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1960). Formulabs
licensed a secret ink formula to Hartley; Hartley sued Dupont for sup plying de-
fective dye; on Dupont's motions for discovery, the court ordered Haey to dis-
close the secret formula; at that point Formulabs had the right to intervene under
former FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a)(3) because Hartley possessed its trade secret
property under the license agreement, Hartley was subject to discovery orders, and
therefore Formulabs' property was subject to control or disposition by the court;
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 (1960); see subsequent decision sustaining jurisdiction
over this claim in intervention, Formulab, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485
(9th Cir. 1963). But see Carey, Baxter & Kennedy, Inc. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 346
F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1965) (rejecting an argument that goodwill and past salaries
were property subject to the control or disposition of the court).
Some disagreement arises as to whether property vested in the Alien Property
Custodian under the Trading with the Enemy Act is property subject to the con-
trol or disposition of the court when the Custodian is sued for the return of the
property. One view is that the property is not subject to control of the court be-
cause the property is vested exclusively in the Custodian and the action against
him is purely in personam and not in rem. In Kaufman v. Societe Internationale,
188 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1951), Interhandel, a Swiss corporation, sued the
Alien Property Custodian to recover seized assets on the grounds it was not
enemy dominated. Minority United States shareholders were denied intervention
because under former FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a),(2) they would not be bound byjudgment and under former FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a) (3) because they did not have
an interest in the property whose title was in Interhandel. The Supreme Court
reversed without mentioning FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a) (3) and held that the case fell
squarely within Fan. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (2) in that Interhandel was inadequately
representing the minority shareholder interests and they might be bound by the
judgment. 343 U.S. 156 (1952).
Thereafter, a second group of shareholders, taking a different position from
the first group of shareholders, was also allowed to intervene under FED. R. Civ. P.
24(a) (2) on the grounds that the first group and Interhandel did not adequately
represent their interests. However, in reaching this conclusion, the District Court
rejected the claim of intervention under FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (3) and said:
The present suit is solely of statutory origin (Sec. 9(a) of the
Trading With the Enemy Act) and has all the indicia of an action in
personam .... The injunctive provision of that section, preventing disposi-
tion of the assets until the court's decision, does not convert the suit into
an in rem proceeding; it is simply a freeze order designated to maintain
the status quo. Nor can it be said that in any real sense property in the
possession of the Alien Property Custodian is 'in the custody or subject
to the control or disposition of the court.' No court process has touched
(Continued on next page)
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The second most obvious case was one where the non-party
would potentially be bound under principles of res judicata
because of his connection with some party to the litigation. A host
of people, such as indemnitors or stockholders, could be bound
because they were either in privity with, or were being represented
by, a party to a proceeding. The idea was, however, that if the
circumstances showed that an existing party would adequately
represent the non-party's interests, there was no need for the
intervention. Consequently the rule emerged in 24 (a) (2) of
1938:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone
shall be permitted to intervene in an action: ... (2) when
the representation of the applicant's interest by existing
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
it; it passes to plaintiff or remains with defendant depending on the
court's in personam judgment. Indeed the injunctive provisions of Section
9(a) appear to put the property entirely outside the court's control from
the day suit is filed. During all this time, the property may be used by
the Custodian without court supervision, the sole condition being that
it be held intact.
Societe Internationale v. McGrath (McGranery), 17 FED. Ru.s SEnv. 24a. 3, Case
3 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
However, the better view asserts that when the Custodian is sued, since the
Act requires the Custodian to retain custody and make disposition in accord with
the court's final adjudication, the Act clearly subjects the vested property to the
control or disposition of the court. International Mortgage and Investment Corp.
v. Von Clem, 301 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1962). In allowing equitable owners and
shareholders of a corporation to intervene as defendants in the corporation's suit
against the Alien Property Custodian, the court sustained intervention both on
the basis of former Fi. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) and (a)(3), indicating that prior
to the 1946 amendment, the property would have been considered within the
"custody" of the Custodian, and not the Court, but that after 1946 the property
was subject to the "control or disposition" of the Court.
Under either theory, the results in the individual cases allowing or denying
intervention under the Act can usually be reconciled by examining the nature of
the intervener's interest in relation to the stage of the proceedings and the various
specific provisions of the Act. Some decisions have denied intervention on the
legitimate grounds that the nature of the interveners claims were really claims
against the plaintiff, were not claims asserting an interest in the property and
were barred by various provisions of the Act prohibiting liens against the property
once it had vested in the Custodian. Von Opel v. Uebersee Finaz Korporation,
A. G., 225 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 935 (1956) (wife
could not assert lien on husband plaintiff's claim); Societe Internationale v.
Kennedy, 231 F. Supp. 132 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (neither a party as attorney for the
successful intervener, nor an agent for the plaintiff could intervene to assert
claims for fees, after a stipulated settlement); see also McGrath v. American
Nat'l Bank of Denver, 117 F. Supp. 133 (D. Colo. 1953), aff'd sub nom, Bantel v.
McGrath, 215 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1954) (where the Attorney General institutes
a summary proceeding under the Trading with the Enemy Act to compel delivery
of possession of enemy-owned property which has been effectively seized by a
valid vesting order, ofer persons claiming title thereto may not intervene but
must seek relief in another proceeding).
1969]
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parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may
be bound by a judgment in the action .... 8
In the first two situations, the interest of the intervener and
the absence of any effective alternative remedy so far outweighed
the interests of the parties and of the court that intervention was
said to be "of right." Some important consequences attached to
this concept that intervention was "absolute" or "of right": (1) if
the applicant's right to intervene was denied, the denial was a
final order, and the applicant had the right to immediate appeal;
(2) the standard of appellate review made the question one of
law; (3) ancillary jurisdiction doctrines automatically applied to
overcome jurisdictional objections to the interveners claim; and,
8 Under this subdivision, intervention bad to be predicated upon both of the
factors referred to therein, i.e., that the intervener's interest was or might be
inadequately represented and that he would or might be bound by a judgment
in the action. If it was clear that the applicant could not be bound by thejudgment, he could not intervene as of right under (a)(2). Thompson v.
Broadfoot, 165 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1948).
The majority of cases interpreted the word "hound" in the narrow legal sense
that the petitioned would be bound under the principles of res judicata. Sutphen
Estates v. United States, 842 U.S. 19 (1951); Archer v. United States, 268 F.2d
687 (10th Cir. 1959); Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 284 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.
1956) cert denied, 352 U.S. 918 (1956); United States v. Wilhelm Reich
Foundation, 17 F.R.D. 96 (D. Me. 1954), aft'd, 221 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 842 (1955); Kelley v. Pascal Sys., Inc., 183 F. Supp.
775 (E.D. Ky. 1960); Ar-Tik Sys. v. Dairy Queen, 22 F.R.D. 122 (E.D. Pa.
1958); Kimberly Knitwear, Inc. v. Hall, 20 F.R.D. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Durkin
v. Pet Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 374 (W.D. Ark 1953).
A number of other cases, however, interpreted "bound" in the broader sense
that as a practical matter the petitioner's ability to protect his interest would be
substantially affected. Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960); Ford Motor
Co. v. Bisanz Bros., Inc., 249 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1957); Textile Workers Union v.
The Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 851 U.S. 909
(1956); Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1953).
In 1961, the Supreme Court in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States,
366 U.S. 683 (1961), apparently confirmed the narrow view. Fox v. Glickman
Corp., 355 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966); Stadin
v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915(1963); United States v. American Socy of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
202 F. Supp. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); see concurring opinion of Judge Hays in
International Mortgage Inv. Corp. v. Von Clem, 301 F.2d 857, 866 (2d Cir.
1962):
... the Court in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States .. . made it
clear... that its present conception of Rule 24(a) (2) limits its applica-
tion to cases in which judgment in the main action would legally preclude
the applicant under the rule of res judicata. Id. at 866.
Degge v. City of Boulder, Colorado, 336 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1964); Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Western Elec. Corp., 308 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 936 (1963).
But even after Sam Fox, it was asserted that some liberality remained in
situations where the total absence of a remedy for the applicant could be analogized
to the binding effect of res judicata. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Standard Oil Co.,
304 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 57,
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(4) the successful intervener had full procedural status as a party
in the litigation.
The third situation covered by the 1938 rule did not con-
template either of the above two situations, that is, that there
was property in custody of the court, or that an inadequately
represented intervener would be bound by res judicata. Rather,
here the intervener had a claim or defense which, as a matter of
convenience, he would like to enter, instead of initiating his own
lawsuit against either of the parties. Since in these cases the
intervener presumably had some effective alternative remedy, his
interest did not automatically predominate over the interests of the
parties and of the court. This type of intervention was thus
thought of as "permissive," or subject to the discretion of the
trial judge. Thus, in contrast to "intervention of right," the op-
posite consequences attached to the concept "permissive inter-
vention": (1) the denial of the permissive or conditional right
was not generally a ground for immediate appeal; (2) the stand-
ard of appellate review of the trial judge's denial was whether he
abused his discretion; (3) there had to be independent juris-
dictional bases to sustain the intervener's claim; and (4) the pro-
cedural status of the successful permissive intervener was sub-
ject to regulation of the court. To cover this third situation of
permissive intervention, Rule 24 (b) of 1938 provided:
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application any-
one may be permitted to intervene in action: . . . (2) when
an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a
question of law or fact in common. In exercising its discretion
the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties.
After the adoption of Rule 24 in 1938, several developments
occurred. First, there were cases where the applicant practically
had no effective alternative remedy if intervention was denied,
but the language of Rule 24 did not seem to cover it. Here the
courts had to stretch the language of all threc provisions in order
to grant intervention. One stretch came under Rule 24 (b). This
rule seemed to contemplate a two-way dispute and the alignment
of the intervener either on the side of plaintiff or of the defendant
with his common "claim or defense." Cases involving modem
1969]
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three-way disputes, where the plaintiff was really claiming against
both parties, conceptually did not fit this language. Consequently,
the language of Rule 24 (b) was stretched to allow intervention
where it was difficult to see what claim or defense, or interest the
intervener had in common with the claims of the original
parties.9 Sometimes intervention of right under 24 (a) (3) was
used. Here by stretching the word "property" in the custody of
the court, or by fictionalizing constructive funds, the courts were
able to encompass other three-way disputes which would not
formerly have been considered in the nature of in rem pro-
ceedings.10
But the developments under Rule 24 were not all in the
direction of expanding intervention. There was a cyclical move-
ment where Rule 24 (a) (2) was at times expanded and at times
contracted for varying reasons. Expansions took place to cover
cases where the intervener would not be bound under strict
res judicata principles because of his lack of relation to the parties,
but as a practical matter, the impact of the decision upon the inter-
vener would be the equivalent of res judicata. The equivalent
impact could occur for various reasons such as the precedential
effect of stare decisis or lack of the intervener's standing to obtain
an alternative remedy. Here the courts were justified in granting
intervention by stretching the requirement that the intervener
would be "bound." Running in the opposite direction, con-
tractions of Rule 24 (a) (2) took place in cases where it seemed
best to the court to bring the litigation to a conclusion without
interference from the intervener, either because the intervener
would have some other adequate remedy, or if he had none, be-
cause the court was not concerned about leaving him factually
prejudiced, but legally without a remedy.1
B. Rule 24 (a) of 1966
The strains of expansion and contraction were relieved by
revising the 1938 Rule in 1966. The 1966 amendment, effective
July 1, 1966, combined and recast former (a) (2) and (a) (3) into
9 See 4 MooRE, f24.10[2], and discussion of cases considering the question
of sufficient interest under FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) in note 43 infra.10 See summary of 1966 Committee Note, in text at note 12 infra.
11 See cases cited at note 8 supra.
[Vol. 57,
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one subdivision numbered (a) (2). Rule 24 (b) was left unaltered.
Rule 24 (a) now provides:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone
shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a
statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to
intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest re-
lating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is
adequately represented by existing parties.
It is to be noted that the old rule did not require a showing
that representation was inadequate in cases involving property
in the custody of or subject to the control or disposition of a
court. The new rule, however, subjects the right to intervene in
all cases, in which no absolute right exists under statute, to the
concluding clause "unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties." In other words, intervention of
right, other than statutory intervention, can be exercised only if
the applicant's interest is not adequately represented by existing
parties.
The reasons for the 1966 amendment are fully explored in the
Advisory Committee's Note. In brief summary, these reasons are:
1. The amendment makes Rule 24 consistent with the 1966
revision of Rules 19 and 23.
2. Former (a) (3) was unduly restricted to cases where property
was in the control of the court; through the fiction of finding a
fund, the courts could satisfy the requirement in almost any case;
the true test should not be whether the court has control of
property, but whether the interest of the absent person will as a
practical matter be substantially affected.12
12 See dissent of Justice Stewart in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 153-154 (1967): "The purpose of the revision was
to remedy certain logical shortcomings in the construction of the former 24(a) (2)
and to give recognition to decisions . . .which had expanded intervention
under the former 24(a)(3) beyond the strict pro interesse suo model it
embodied."
The Advisory Committee's Note refers to the test as: "if an absentee would
be substantially affected in a practical sense" (emphasis added). However the
word "substantially" does not appear in the Rule, and was deleted from an
earlier draft which required that the judgment "substantially" impede or impair
the applicant's interest. See Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
54 GEo. L.J. 1204, 1232 (1966).
1969]
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3. In certain cases, subdivision (a) (2) was capable of being
interpreted so narrowly as to be meaningless. The original purpose
of the provision was to allow intervention where representation
was inadequate, and the person would be bound in the sense
that he would, as a practical matter, be substantially affected.
However, since the view was taken that "bound" meant only in
the res judicata sense, in class actions at least, it might theoreti-
cally be argued that no applicant would ever be entitled to inter-
vene, since if he were inadequately represented, he might not at
the same time be "bound" because of due process requirements."
4. The revision theory of Rule 19 calls for a listing of factors
for decision, rather than definitional concepts. In keeping with this
theory, the language of the 1966 amendment to Rule 24 grants
intervention to a person when his position is comparable with
that of a person "needed for just adjudication" under Rule
19 (a) (2) (i) ,14 unless his interest is already adequately repre-
sented. 15
13 Professor James states the dilemma and then poses a practical way out of it:
If the would-be intervenor is adequately represented he cannot meet the
first requirement; if he is so represented he will not be bound by the
judgment and therefore fails to meet the second requirement. But in-
adequacy is not an integer. Surely representation might be inadequate
for the purpose of intervention in many cases where it would not reach
due process proportions. F. JAEs, ron. PnocnunmR §10.19, at 503-04
(1965).
See cases cited, note 8 supra, and text, Part V C infra.
14 FE. R. Crv. P. 19(a)(2)(i) provides:
(a) A person . . .shall be joinet . . . if. . .(2) he claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition
of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest.
15 The difficulty in applying the old distinctions between property cases under
former (a)(3) and res judicata cases under (a)(2) was shown in a series of
suits by foreign corporations to reclaim property vested by the Alien Property
Custodian under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, 50 U.S.C. App.
§119, as amended by the First War Powers Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 839, 50 U.S.C.
App. (Supp. V) § 5(b). In a leading case on the subject. Kaufman v. Societe
Internationale, 343 U.S. 156 (1952), "Interhandel," a Swiss corporation, sued
to recover assets on the grounds it was not enemy-dominated. Minority United
States shareholders moved to intervene as plaintiffs to assert their claim conceding
that Interhandel was enemy-dominated, but that they, as innocent shareholders,
were entitled to return of assets which were proportionate to their interests. In
reversing a denial of their right to intervene, the Supreme Court first agreed with
the shareholders' interpretation of the Act that Congress had no intent to confiscate
innocent interests. The Court then found that Interhandel was inadequately
representing those interests by denying enemy-domination and by taking the
position that any recovery or settlement would be distributed to all shareholders
rather than only to innocent shareholders. Since the innocent shareholders might
be bound by a judgment in this corporate action, the claim for intervention fell
(Continued on next page)
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IV. MECHANICS OF INTERVENTION
Under the practice prior to the Federal Rules, it was better,
although not necessary, to give notice to the parties of the petition
for leave to intervene.16 Rule 24 (c) as originally promulgated in
1937 required that the motion to intervene be served, but only on
parties "affected thereby."17 The 1963 amendment of Rule 24 (c)
eliminated these words and provided that service shall be made as
provided in Rule 5. Thus, in all cases, whether the right to inter-
vene is unconditional or conditional, statutory or non-statutory,
the person desiring to intervene must serve a motion to intervene
on all parties as provided in Rule 5.
Like other motions, the motion to intervene must state it's
grounds.'8 The Rule also provides that the motion is to be ac-
companied by a pleading which sets forth the claim or defense
for which intervention is sought. That is, the pleading is to be
served with the motion. The motion thus technically may not
"adopt" the pleading of an original party,19 nor may it merely
describe a future pleading. However, some leeway has been al-
lowed where there could be no prejudice to the parties.20 Cases
showing such leniency could probably be categorized as instances
of adding or substituting necessary parties to the claims already
made by the original parties. Further leniency might be authorized
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
squarely within former FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The Court also noted that in
disputes of this type, one corporate suit was more appropriate under the equity
powers of the court than a multiplicity of individual suits by shareholders against
the Property Custodian. See also alien property cases cited in note 7 supra.16 Lombard Inv. Co. v. Seaboard Mfg. Co., 74 F. 325 (C.C. Ala. 1896).
17 Teamsters Local 523 v. Keystone Freight Lines, 128 F.2d 326 (10th Cir.
1941).
18 See Hunt v. Yeatman, 264 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (denying
permissive intervention to mother of infant plaintiff in action brought by father
as next friend when it appeared that the intervention was for the purpose of
discontinuing the suit on behalf of the infant and it did not appear that the
father was inadequately protecting the interests of the infant; court characterized
petition as one essentially for substitution, rather than intervention). See Official
Form 23; R. A. LAv=n & G. D. Hounmo, MA~.L oF Fan. PRACTICE §§
8.153-3.155 (1967).
19 Pikor v. Cinerama Prods. Corp., 25 F.R.D. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).20 Turner v. McWhirter Material Handling Co., 35 F.R.D. 560 (N.D. Ga.
1964) (in FLSA case, motion to strike Secretary of Lahor's intervention motion
for his failure to attach pleading was defeated by the Secretary's counter-motion
to allowv the filing of a pleading); Dalva v. Bailey, 158 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y.
1957) (allowing intervening plaintiff in stockholder derivative suit to "adopt"
plaintiff's complaint, but, upon dropping of original party plaintiff, requiring the
intervener to file an amended complaint complying with verification requirements
of FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1).
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by interpreting Rule 10 (c) to allow adoption of averments in
other pleadings by reference.
The original motion and pleading are to be served and filed
in accordance with Rule 5. One provision of Rule 5 (a) is worth
noting. In case a party to the action is in default for failure to
appear, the motion and pleading of the person seeking inter-
vention need not be served on the non-appearing party, unless
the intervener's pleading states a new or additional claim for
relief against the non-appearing, defaulting party. If it does state
such a claim, then service is to be made in the manner provided
for service of a summons in Rule 4.21
It is possible, of course, for original parties to waive any
objections they otherwise might have because of the intervener's
failure to comply with proper procedure.m At the same time, such
interveners who have been admitted into the action by the trial
court must be distinguished from a mere amicus curiae or a person
who has been heard but has never intervened.23
V. APPLICATION OF REVISED RuLE 24 (a) of 1966
A. In General
As a result of the 1966 revision, the absolute right to intervene
now exists under present Rule 24 (a) (2) when the petitioner
claims an interest in the subject of the action, the interest may be
adversely affected by disposition of the action, and the interest
is not adequately represented.24 The 1967 decision of the Supreme
21 Ruck v. Spray Cotton Mills, 120 F. Supp. 944 (M.D.N.C. 1954) (where a
plaintiff settled his case without the knowlege of his attorneys, the attorney's
attempt to serve him by mail with a notice and motion to intervene was ineffectual
to bring him back into court).
In a case within 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1964), the court must certify the facts
to the Attorney General so that he becomes apprised that the constitutionality of
an act of Congress has been drawn into question, and hence can take steps to
intervene if he so desires. But failure to certify does not deprive the district
court of jurisdiction, and an opportunity for the Attorney General to participate
may be afforded later, on a ppeal, or rehaearing. See Wallach v. Lieberman, 866
F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1966' (-where the constitutional issue was frivolous and the
Attorney General was aforded a later opportunity to submit a brief amicus but
indicated that he did not wish to intervene, the decision of the lower court was
affirmed).22 See Simms v. Andrews, 118 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1941); Klein v. Nu-Way
Shoe Co. 186 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1943).
23 Thus participation without attempt at formal intervention does not give
the participant a right to appeal as a party. Peckham v. Casalduc, 261 F.2d 120
(1st Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 958 (1959).21 See text Part III supra.
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Court in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.25
serves to show both a liberal interpretation of the old, and the
transition to the new Rule 24 (a).
The government brought a civil anti-trust suit against El Paso
Natural Gas Company, charging that El Paso's acquisition of
Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation violated § 7 of the Clayton
Act. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the government
and sent the case back to the district court for El Paso's divestiture
of Pacific Northwest without delay. Three parties then moved to
intervene and were denied intervention by the district court: (1)
the State of California wanted to intervene to assure that under
the terms of the divestiture, Pacific Northwest, or the equivalent
new company, would be restored as an effective competitor in
California; (2) California Edison, a large industrial purchaser of
natural gas from El Paso, was also interested in retaining competi-
tion in the California market; (3) Cascade Natural Gas Corpora-
tion was a Washington-Oregon distributor which received its
sole source of supply from Pacific Northwest and thus also wanted
to see Pacific restored to full competitive status. The government
negotiated a settlement with El Paso and the district court ap-
proved a consent decree governing the terms of the divestiture.
The three non-parties who had been denied intervention appealed.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to
allow the three to intervene as of right, to vacate the consent de-
cree, to have de novo hearings on the type of divestiture, and to
have a new judge assigned to hear the case. Speaking for five
members of the Court, Justice Douglas justified the intervention
of the State of California and of California Edison under former
Rule 24 (a) (3) :
Under old Rule 24(a) (3) those 'adversely affected' by a
disposition of property would usually be those who have an
interest in the property. But we cannot read it to mean ex-
clusively that group.
Rule 24(a) (3) was not merely a restatement of existing
federal practice at law and in equity. If it had been, there
would be force in the argument that the rigidity of the older
cases remains unaltered, restricting intervention as of right
25 386 U.S. 129 (1967) discussed in Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention
before Courts, Agencies and Arbitrators, 81 HAnv. L. REv. 721 (1968); noted
1968 D=s LJ. 117.
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very narrowly, as for example where there is a fund in court
to which a third party asserts a right that would be lost
absent intervention. . . But the Advisory Committee [of
1938] stated that Rule 24 'amplifies and restates the present
federal practice at law and in equity.' We therefore know
that some elasticity was injected; and the question is, how
much. [footnotes omitted] 26
Justice Douglas then drew an analogy to Missouri-Kansas Pipe
Line Co. v. United States27 where Panhandle, as a protected
competitor, had been allowed to intervene in a subsequent consent
decree proceeding because the original decree had been specifically
designed to protect Panhandle's economic independence. Here,
the purpose of the divestiture order was to protect the competitive
system in California, and thus both the State and California
Edison were directly interested and "so situated" as to be
"adversely affected" under former (a) (3). Continuing, Justice
Douglas summarily concluded that Cascade (the Washington-
Oregon distributor) could also intervene under the new Rule
24 (a) (2) as one having an "interest in the transaction" and on
the grounds that the government had fallen far short of repre-
senting that interest. On this point, Justice Douglas examined at
length the proposed terms of the divestiture decree to show that
the government had "knuckled under" to El Paso in granting
too many concessions as to gas reserves, financial power and
control, and that the trial judge had improperly approved a plan
of non-competition. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan, dis-
sented, primarily on the grounds that private parties should not
be allowed to intervene in government anti-trust suits since the
government should be considered to represent their interests.28
26 386 U.S. at 133-34.
27 312 U.S. 502 (1941).
28 Commentators have generally viewed the case as being somewhat unique
and limited as precedential value for the following reasons: (1) there is strong
policy and precedent generally against allowing private parties to interfere with
the government's strategy of enforcing the anti-trust laws; (2) this was a unique
case of the government "knuckling under" in the face of a prior Supreme Court
decree in the same case; (3) the intervention here was applied for and allowed
after the violation had been judicially determined and thus should be limited to
proceedings to determine shaping of the decree; and (4) it is difficult to aree
analytically with the court's implied conclusion that the interveners were equvaent
to necessary parties under Rule 19, who could have been joined in any event.
Rather, the result is more compatible with a finding under Rule 24(b) that private
parties ought to be let in under these circumstances. See Kaplan, Continuing
Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civi
(Continued on next page)
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In summary, an application for non-statutory intervention
as of right under the 1966 version of Rule 24 (a) must meet the
following requirements: The application must (1) be timely,
(2) show an interest in the subject matter of the action, (3) show
that the protection of the interest may be impaired by the dis-
position of the action, and (4) show that the interest is not
adequately represented by an existing party.29 The 1966 amend-
ment did not change the words concerning the first requirement
as to timeliness, and consequently did not change that previous
standard.30 Each of the last three requirements is discussed sepa-
rately in following sections. However, even though they are treated
separately for analytical purposes, the three requirements of in-
terest, impairment, and inadequacy of representation are only
different facets of the same question: 31 considering the impact on
the applicant's interest if he is not given the right to intervene,
should the applicant now be granted that right?
In considering the three requirements, the general objectives
stated at the beginning of this article32 should be kept in mind.
In this context, as the absolute right of the applicant for inter-
vention is expanded, the rights of the original parties to control
the litigation are diminished. Further, as the absolute right of
intervention is expanded, the interests of judicial administration
are served to the extent that the substitution of a more complex
litigation now, for what would otherwise probably be two or more
separate law suits, furthers efficiency, consistency and accuracy.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Procedure I, 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 405 (1967); Shapiro, supra note 25, at
743-44, 757-58; Note, Federal Civil Procedure: Intervention of Right Granted
Private Party in Government Antitrust Suit Under New Rule 24(a)(2), 1968 DUKE
L.J. 117, 127, 131-33.
Cf. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal.
1967) (after entry of consent decree in government anti-trust case, trial court
denied motion by private parties to intervene in order to vacate decree; El Paso
was distinguished on the basis that the interveners there had made motion prior
to entry of the divestiture order, whereas here motion was made after entry of
decree); but see United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 280 F. Supp. 260
(E.D. Ky. 1967), discussed in note 46 infra.
29 See restatements of the last three requirements in Nuesse v. Camp, 385
F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1967).
30 For standards as to timeliness, see 4 MooRE f24.13]; see United States
v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (D.C. Cal. 1967): "[I]t is clear that
[the El Paso] case does not rewrite Rule 24(a) and (b) to eliminate the require-
ments of timeliness." Id. at 437.
3' See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.C. Cir. 1968).32 See text, Part II supra; i.e., securing the interest of the original parties, of
the intervener, of the trial and appellate courts, of political entities, and the
creative compromise of these interests.
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The obvious point is that the interests of the original parties and
the interest of judicial administration are also at stake in every
intervention case. Rule 24 (a), however, formally speaks only to an
analysis of the interests of the applicant for intervention, i.e.,
whether he has an intent, whether it will be impaired, and
whether it is adequately represented. Nevertheless, since analogous
language has been used in Rule 19, appropriate judicial treatment
of intervention will necessarily consider the policies implicit in
Rule 19, i.e., the interests of the original parties and of the court
in judicial administration. 33
The case of Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States34
represents the new approach that should be taken under new
Rule 24 (a) (2). The United States brought a declaratory judg-
ment and injunction action against the defendants to restrain
them from erecting structures on a coral reef lying ten miles off
the Florida coast. The Atlantis Corporation had previously at-
tempted to lay clain- to ownership of the coral reef and sought to
intervene to answer and to cross-claim against the defendants. The
district court denied intervention on the ground that Atlantis did
not have an "interest" that would justify intervention. The Fifth
Circuit reversed and held that Atlantis could intervene as of right.
The court first reviewed the revision of Rule 24. But before
moving to an analysis of the three requirements in the Rule, Judge
Brown, speaking for the court, examined whether Atlantis was a
party needed for just adjudication under Rule 19.35 Having con-
33 Similar policies are explicitly stated in Fan. R. Civ. P. 24(b), raising the
suggestion, a view held by this author, that the distinction between intervention
of right and permissive intervention is really one of degree rather than of kind.
See Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention before Courts, Agencies and Arbi-trators, 81 -H~xv. L. REV. 721, 758 (1068).
Professor Cohn describes the three interests as those of (1) the non-parties
applying for intervention, (2) trial convenience and (3) the original parties, and
states: 'The concept of intervention as of right carries with it an implicit judgment
that justice demands that the first interest should predominate over the other
two." Cohn supra note 12, at 1232. See also analysis of interests in Note, The
Litigant and the Absentee In Federal Multiparty Practice, 116 U. PA. L. REv.
531 (1968).
34 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967), noted 1967 DuxE L.J. 1251.
3G The judge stated: In assaying the new Rule, several things stand out.
The first, as the Government acknowledges, is that this amounts to a
legislative repeal of the rigid Sam Fox res judicata rule. But more im-
portant, the revision was a coordinated one to tie more closely together
the related situations of joinder, FR Crv. P. 19, and class actions, FR
Crv. P. 23.
As the Advisory Committee's notes reflect, there are competing
interests at work in this area. On the one hand, there is the private
(Continued on next page)
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cluded that it was such a party, Judge Brown, in an explicit
analysis under Rule 24 (a), held that Atlantis had an interest 3
which would be practically affected and that it was not adequately
represented.37 This decision is an important one, for it analyzes
intervention not only in terms of the three requirements expressed
on the face of Rule 24 (a), but also in terms of the considerations
expressed in amended Rule 19.38
B. Applicant Must Claim an Interest Relating
to the Property or Transaction Which is
the Subject of the Action
Former Rule 24 (a) (2) required that representation of the
applicant's "interest" might be inadequate and that the appli-
cant might be "bound." 39 Former Rule 24 (a) (3) required that
the applicant be adversely "affected" by the disposition of "prop-
erty" within the control of the court.4 In merging these require-
ments, the 1966 amendment requires an "interest relating to the
transaction or property that is the subject of the action." Since
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
suitor's interests in having his own lawsuit subject to no one else's direc-
tion or meddling. On the other hand, however, is the great public
interest, especially in these explosive days of ever-increasing dockets, of
having a disposition at a single time of as much of the controversy to
as many of the parties as is fairly possible consistent with due process.
In these three Rules the Advisory Committee, unsatisfied with the
former Rules which too frequently defined application in terms of rigid
legal concepts such as joint, common ownership, res judicata, or the
like, as well as court efforts in applying them, deliberately set out on a
more pragmatic course. For the purpose of our problem, this course is
reflected in the almost, If not quite, uniform language concerning a party
who claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter im-
pair or impede his ability to protect that interest. [footnotes omitted].
379 F.2d 818, 823-25 (5th Cir. 1967).
36 See text at 45 infra.
37 See note 62 infra.3 8 At the outset, the court noted the wastefulness and delay that denial of
intervention can create: (1) the trial court stayed the main action pending
the appeal; in this time the merits could already have been decided; (2) the
sparring over intervention inevitably led deep into arguments going to the merits
of the case; yet after all the delay and effort, nothing had been decided since
intervention merely resolves an issue at the pleading stage as to the sufficiency of
the applicant's pleading to raise a right to intervene.
Consider te common sense approach, where after an extensive analysis
showing that the applicant was not entitled to intervene, Judge Wright granted
the right to intervene so that on appeal, the entire case could be considered on
its merits. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.C. Cir. 1968).39 See note 8 supra.40 See note 15 supra.
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the intervener must now have an interest relating to the trans-
action or property, prior precedent deciding that the applicant
had a sufficient "interest" under 24 (a) (2) ,41 or an interest in
"property" under 24 (a) (3) ,42 is generally controlling under the
new rule. It does not necessarily follow, however, that precedent
finding insufficient interest and denying intervention is also con-
trolling.
The liberalization of Rule 24 (a) was not aimed at revising
the nature of the applicant's interest, but was focused mainly on
relaxing the requirement that the applicant might be bound
under the doctrine of res judicata. Thus, as observed by Judge J.
Skelly Wright:
[W]hile one's interests need no longer be decisively affected
before intervention will be allowed, there is nothing in the
new rule or in its attendant commentary to indicate that it
effected a change in the kind of interest required. Thus the
thrust of the revision seems clearly to be concerned with the
adequacy of representation and not with any notion of ex-
panding the types of interests that will satisfy the rule. Still
required for intervention is a direct, substantial, legally pro-
tectable interest in the proceedings. 43
41 See 4 MoonE f24.08[1]. However, under the old FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a) (2),
the emphasis was not on the nature of the applicant's interest, but on the question:
was there a possibility that the applicant would be bound? See Hobson v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1968), quoting this position from 4 MooRE f124.0811].
42 See MooRE f24.09[2], at 45: '[I]t must be an interest known and
protected by the law: a claim of ownershin, or a lesser interest, sufficient and of
the Tpe to'be denominated a lien, equitabfe or legal."
4Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.C. Cir. 1968). However, a
commentator on Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386
U.S. 129 (1967) notes that Rule 24(a) emphasizes what he calls a "consequential"
view of interest; that is that "interest" cannot be discussed in the abstract but
only in the context that if intervention is not allowed, the applicant will have no
feasible alternative remedy for protecting his interest. Noted in 1968 DurE L.J.
117, 124. See also quote in text at note 44 infra.
The concept of "interest" is not susceptible of definition apart from a case-
by-case approach in the context of continuously changing criteria of the substantive
law. One clear analogy, however, is the concent of 'standing" in constitutional
litigation. Just as "standing" can be expandea to give greater power to the
"private attorney general," see Flast v. Cohen, 88 S. Ct. 1942 (1968) (allowing
taxpayer to contest federal expenditure), so too, "interest" under FED. R. Crv. P.
24(a) can be expanded with substantive law to grant representation of interests
and remedies heretofore rejected.
Other sources of comparative analysis are the cases granting or denying
permissive intervention under FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Here, although FED. R.
Civ. P. 24(b) requires only a "claim or defense" in common, and does not
mention "interest," many of the cases talk in terms of the "interest" of the
applicant. The two headlings below give examples of such cases under FED. R.
Crv. P. 24(b).
Insufficient Interest-A labor union has been denied intervention in a re-
apportionment suit. League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp.
(Continzed on next page)
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(Footnote continued from preceding page)
189 (D. Neb. 1962) (League of Municipalities also dismissed as improper party
plaintiff); see also Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754 (D. Conn. 1964)(denying intervention to towns in reapportionment suit with no discussion of
24(b), aff'd per curiam, 378 U.S. 562 (1964). The United States has been
denied intervention in a school desegregation case. Allen v. County School Bd.
of Prince Edward County, 28 F.R1.D. 358 (E.D. Va. 1961); but see later cases
allowing intervention by Attorney General under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,§ 902, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (1964); Harris v. Crenshaw County Bd. of Educ.,
259 F. Supp. 167 (M.C. Ala. 1966); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of
Educ., 255 F. Supp. 88 (S.D. Ga. 1966). Competitors and other private parties
have been denied intervention in government anti-trust proceedings. United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 41 F.R.D. 342 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (where
ALCOA had been a successful bidder on a large contract and had obtained
government approval to assign the contract to wholly owned subsidiary, un-
successful bidder would not be permitted to intervene in government anti-trust
suit in which ALCOA had been ordered to divest itself of subsidiary when ap-
plicant sought to intervene to request injunction against award of the contract);
United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 10 FED. RuLxs SEmv. 2d 24a.51, Case
1 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (competitor not permitted to intervene in government anti-
trust suit for purpose of challenging a clause in divestiture order that is believes
will put it at a competitive disadvantage). Others have been similarly denied
intervention for lack of the requisite interest. Rose v. Brotherhood of R. & S.S.
Clerks, 181 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950) (petition
to intervene must present a justiciable controversy and not one within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Mediation Board); Wilson v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 21
F.R.D. 588 (N.D. I1. 1957) (union could not intervene as defendant in veterans
suit against employer for reinstatement); cf. NLRB v. Swift & Co., 130 F. Supp.
214 (E.D. Mo. 1955) (union representing employees denied intervention in
action by Board against employer on ground that Board should retain control
of the litigation; but union permitted to participate as amicus curiae), modified on
other grounds, 233 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 196).
Still others have been denied because the intervener's claim or defense did
not involve a question of law or fact in common with the main action. True
Gun-All Equip. Corp. v. Bishop Int'l Eng'r Co., 26 F.R.D. 150 (E.D. Ky. 1960)(intervention denied where creditor of defendant sought to intervene as a
plaintiff to raise an entirely separate question of liability to that raised in the
main claim and where there was no question of law or fact common to the main
claim raised by the applicant for intervention); Stickler Eng'r Corp. v. Michael
Flynn Mfg. Co., 28 F.R.D. 12 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (where Strickler sued Flynn for
non-delivery of boilers, the purchasers of boilers from Stickler could not inter-
vene to assert new cause of action against Strickler and Flynn).
Sufficient Interest-Other examples show grants of permissive intervention
where the court must by implication find that the claimant is a person with
sufficient interest and standing to press its claim. Textile Workers Union v. The
Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 851 U.S. 909 (1956)(dictum: union permitted to intervene in action by employers challenging Walsh-
Healy determination that had raised minimum wages); Ruby v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 252 F. Sum). 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (rival union FEIA allowed
intervention in ALPA's decliratory judgment action against'employer to determine
crew complement), appeal dism*ssed as moot, 360 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1966);
Groseclose v. Great N. Ry., 25 F.R.D. 181 (D. Mont. 1960) (union permitted to
intervene in action by employees against railroad for determination of re-employ-
ment rights under Universal Military Training Act); O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38
F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (United States allowed to intervene to resist dis-
covery of government documents); Holcomb v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 255 F.2d 577(10th Cir. 1958) (persons alleged to have conspired with insurance company
to defraud insured were permitted to intervene in company's interpleader action
brought to determine beneficiaries of annuity policy); United States v. Martin,
267 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1959) (in declaratory class action by United States to
adjudicate rights of parties affected by irrigation uroject, land owner claiming
overflow righis could intervene as defendant as of riglit and would be nermtted
to file counterclaim); Berman v. Herrick, 30 F.R.D. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (fraud
action against building owners); Markovic v. National City Bank, 12 F.R.D.
(Continued on next page)
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The direct interest described by Judge Wright has been found
lacking in a number of cases,44 but has been found present in
others.45 While the principle has remained constnt through the
1966 revision that the applicant must have a sufficient interest,
the application of this principle has been subject to some change.46
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
175 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (in an action by plaintiff to recover deposit made by a
corporation whose assets were decreed to have been vested in plaintiff by
Yugoslav nationalization decree, permissive intervention was granted the corpora-
tion and two individuals who asserted a claim to a portion of the funds by
virtue of certain agreements or assignments made by the corporation, long prior
to the promulgation of the nationalization decree); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham
County Bd. of Educ., Harris v. Gibson, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964) (affirming
permissive intervention by Negro students previously accepted for transfer to all
white school in suit by parents of white children to enjoin effectuation of
voluntary plan for desegregation), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964).
44 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 387 F.2d 939 (3d Cir.
1968) (where plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment against a lender and its
other creditors that the plaintiff's proposed sale of pledged collateral held by them
was "commercially reasonable" under § 9-507(2) of the U.C.C., applicant who
was offering a higher price for the collateral had no interest in the property so
as to justify intervention).
Edmondson v. Nebraska ex rel Meyer, 383 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1967) (State
employee's estate had no interest in declaratory judgment action brought by State
against a tort judgment creditor of the employee to declare that the judgment
had been obtained by frnud; but note special circumstances here made the motion
for intervention a "sham").
United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967)(where government settled anti-trust case by a consent decree, the legal interests
of private parties with pending anti-trust actions against the same defendants were
not "impaired or impeded" nor was the loss of the benefit of having the govern-
ment try the case a sufficient interest to justify intervention; petition also un-
timely).
See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (school super-
intendent who resigned after decree was entered in school desegregation case,
and parents of school children who failed to show specific interest, had no
sufficient interest to intervene when school board in good faith voted not to
appeal, but intervention was granted .n order to have full review on merits).
45Atlantis Dev. Com. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967),
discussed in text notes 34-38, supra (in suit by Government to declare exclusive
ownership of coral reef against the defendant, another party claiming exclusive
ownership had the right to intervene to claim against both the government and
the defendant).46 Thus, Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129
(1967), which was decided under both old FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a) and the new
FFD. R. Crv. P. 24(a), represents an expanded apnlication of "interest" in
holding a State, a customer, and a competitor have a sufficient interest to intervene
in a government anti-trust divestiture proceeding when that interest is inadeouately
represented. The dissent argued that the interests asserted by the applicants
were no more than the general public interests in preserving comnetition and
that in anti-trust cases brought by the government, the Attorney General rep-
resents these interests.
See also United Stntes v. First Nnt'l Bank & Trust Co., 280 F. Supp.
260, 263 (E.D. Ky. 1967). El Paso was found directly in point in an anti-trust
case granting intervention to a shqreholder and a competitor after the govern-
ment failed to anpeal. After a hard-fought contest against a bank merger, Judge
Mac Swinford states that the government "without warning to anyone . . .
makes about a ninety per cent capitulation and now becomes the advocate of the
merger," and comments: (Continued on next page)
[Vol. 57,
Ier's Ai JOIN IN
In Nuesse v. Camp4 7 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia applied the principle to what it termed "administrative
cases." The Court there granted intervention of right to a state
banking commissioner as plaintiff in a suit brought by a state
bank against the Comptroller of the Currency to enjoin the
Comptroller from authorizing a national bank to open a branch
bank where state law did not permit branching. In the trial court,
both the plaintiff state bank and the defendant Comptroller had
successfully resisted intervention on the theory that the only issue
involved was the construction of the National Bank Act, and that
the state banking commissioner did not have sufficient interest in
this issue. But the Court of Appeals reversed by holding that, since
protection of competitive equality of state banks was the core of
the federal statute controlling the branching of national banks, a
state banking commissioner has an adequate interest in the con-
struction of the federal act to justify intervention. The Court
found authority for this in El Paso and in the revision policy of
Rule 24:
We know of no concise yet comprehensive definition of
what constitutes a litigable 'interest' for purpose of standing
and intervention under Rule 24(a) .... We know from the
recent amendments to the civil rules that in the intervention
area the 'interest' test is primarily a practical guide to dis-
posing of law suits by involving as many apparently con-
cerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due pro-
cess. Compare Amended Rule 19 .. . and Rule 23 . . . and
the Advisory Committee Notes. 48
C. Applicant is so Situated that the Disposition of the Action
May as a Practical Matter Impair or Impede His Ability
to Protect that Interest.
Former Rule 24 (a) (2) required that the "applicant is or may
be bound by a judgment in the action." This requirement was
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
If the Court by its decision in Cascade grants intervention of right to
any volunteer claiming to speak for the public interest when he can
convince a court that the Government might have used bad judgment
in conducting or settling a law suit, these interveners are well within
the class entitled to intervene.
udge Swinford also noted that in such a case, where community interest runs
gh, intervention would promote public confidence in the judicial system.
47 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
48 Id. See also discussion of "interest in note 48 supra.
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interpreted to mean that the applicant would be "bound" under
the doctrine of res judicata.49 But later developments in due
process concepts led to a dilemma here. In 1940 the Supreme
Court in Hansberry v. Lee5" held it would be a denial of due
process to give res judicata effect to a class action judgment when
the parties against whom the judgment was invoked were not
parties to the original class suit, nor in privity with any other
parties, nor represented by any party to that litigation. This hold-
ing created, theoretically, a logical impossibility on the face of
Rule 24 (a) (2) in that the conjunctive requirements of inadequate
representation and binding effect could be considered to be
mutually exclusive. The way out of the dilemma was to realize
that many inadequacies of representation do not rise to the level
of due process objections and that inadequacy and binding effect
can co-exist.5 1 But in 1961 the Supreme Court in Sam Fox
Publishing Co. v. United States52 encouraged the dilemma thus
tending to make intervention under Rule 24 (a) (2) somewhat
restrictive. In order to eliminate the logical inconsistency, and to
move from a legalistic test of res judicata to a factual test of
practical impact, a new test was sought. In keeping with a con-
sistent theory in revising Rules 19, 23, and 24, the revision defined
a party needed for just adjudication in Rule 19 and used com-
parable language to describe a member of a class under Rule 23
and a person entitled to intervention as of right under Rule 24. 3
Since the purpose of the revision was in part to liberalize the
old requirement that the applicant would be "bound" under the
doctrine of res judicata, it must follow under the 1966 rule, that
if the applicant can show by precedent that he would have been
"bound" within the meaning of former 24 (a) (2), he falls a
fortiori within the meaning of the 1966 provision that "he is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest."5 4 It
49 See note 8 supra.
50 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
51 See analysis in F. JAMMS, CIViL PaocEDRE § 10.19 (1965), quoted mi
note 13 supra; Note, Intervention of Right In Class Actions: the Dilemma of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), 50 CALi'. L. REV. 89 (1962).
52 366 U.S. 983 (1961).
53 See Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967),
noted 1967 DuKE L.J. 1251; discussed in text, notes 34-38 supra.
54 Coleman Capital Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 43 F.R.D. 407 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (contractor has right to intervene as defendant in a suit against his surety).
See 4 Moopx 124.08 for cases decided under former FED. R. Cxv. P. 24(a) (2).
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would also be a valid inference that the new rule approves those
cases which even prior to the 1966 amendment had departed from
the strict res judicata test, and had sanctioned intervention where
the impact of the intervener was so severe as to be analogous to
res judicata 5
However, the pre-1966 cases denying intervention are now sub-
ject to re-evaluation in light of the language and policy of the new
Rule. The question as to the practical effect on the interest of the
applicant cannot properly be answered until the interest of the
applicant is first analyzed and determined.56 Analysis may end
with the conclusion that the applicant has an insufficient interest.57
If he has a sufficient interest, the question then becomes: what
impact will the disposition of this case have on that interest?
Certainly if the applicant will or may be bound under the
principles of res judicata, or, analogously affected,58 or if his
interest in propcrty subject to control of the court would be ad-
versely affected, 59 he is within the rule.
The further question can be raised whether the adverse impact
of stare decisis standing alone can be sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirement.60 The Fifth Circuit, while conceding that no pre-
1966 case had done so, has answered this question in the af-
firmative. The court, in a case previously discussed,6" held that a
company claiming ownership of a coral reef could intervene in
the governments suit for declaration of ownership of the reef
against another claimant to the reef. The court examined at length
the practical difficulties the applicant would have in attempting
to upset the precedent if the government should win, and con-
cluded that these would as a practical matter impair or impede its
ability to protect its interest.6 2 The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
55 See note 8 supra and cases cited in 4 MOORE 24.08[1] n. 8.
56 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.C.Cir. 1968).57 See notes 43-47 supra.
58 See note 8 supra.
5 0 That is, if the applicant meets the test of former FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (8),
see 4 MooRE fI24.09, he should also meet the test of present FED. IR. Crv. P.
24(a)(2); see note 15 supra.
60 Before 1966, the impact of stare decisis would clearly be a basis for
participation as an amicus curiae, and probably would be a basis for participation
as a permissive intervener. C. Wmcrurr, FEDERAL CouaTs § 75 (1963).61 Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 879 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967), and
text notes 34-38 supra.
62Th question of law involved the interpretation of the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act and other statutes. In outlining the obstacle the applicant would
face in upsetting an adverse decision, the Court noted that the practice for the
(Continued on next page)
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trict of Columbia has agreed with this analysis of the Fifth Circuit,
stating, "[w] e think that under this new test stare decisis
principles may in some cases supply the practical disadvantage that
warrants intervention of right."60 On the other hand, where there
is no real, practical impairment of the intervener's interest as is
required by the rule, intervention has been denied.6
D. Applicant's Interest is Not Adequately
Represented by Existing Parties
The bases for non-statutory intervention previously discussed6 5
are subject to the condition that the applicant's interest is not
adequately represented by existing parties. As originally expressed,
pre-1966 Rule 24(a) (2) granted intervention "when the repre-
sentation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may
be inadequate ..... 60 The 1966 revision, in merging former
clauses (2) and (3), rephrased the old standard so that Rule
24 (a) (2) now grants intervention "unless the applicant's interest
is adequately represented by existing parties."6 7 As noted by
Justice Stewart, the "requirement of inadequate representation by
existing parties as a precondition of the right to intervene under
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Fifth Circuit is to follow the precedent of its own decisions, unless a hearing is
obtained en bane, and that fewer than ten percent of cases were granted
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The Fifth Circuit cautioned, however, that not
every case will justify intervention based on the prospective impact of stare
decisis, but only where the claims coincide and the first litigation will realistically
determine the subsequent litigation.63Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The Court of Ap-
peals allowed a state Commissioner of Banking to intervene in an action by a
state bank to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency from allowing a national
bank to start a branch bank, since the first decision on the subject would probably
be given great weight in subsequent litigations. The court here also reasoned
from the affirmative policy underlying the new intervention rule: if the banking
commissioner were not allowed to intervene, he might bring suit- in "the hope of
sparking a conflict between circuits, and possibly even Supreme Court resolution,"
and that "it is the fragmented approach to adjudication that the revitalized rules
seek to avoid."64 Edmondson v. Nebraska ex rel Meyer, 383 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1967). See
also cases deciding that applicant has no sufficient interest, discussed in text at
notes 43-47 supra.6 5 The bases are: "when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action," see text, Part V B
supra, "and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a rractical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest," see text Part V C
supra.6 6 The omitted part of FED. R. Cry. P. (a) (2) reads: "and the applicant is
or may be bound by a judgment in the action." See text at note 8 supra.6 7 FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a) (3), granting intervention where the court had control
of property, contained no such requirement as to inadequacy of representation.
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the new Rule 24 is obviously an adaptation of the similar standard
contained in the former 24 (a) (2) ."6s Consequently it must be
inferred that prior precedent defining what constituted "in-
adequacy of representation" under the old rule,69 should generally
be applicable under the new rule30
The question can be raised whether the change in language
from "when" the representation may be inadequate to "unless"
the interest is adequately represented, and the relocation of this
clause at the end of the sentence has the effect of placing on the
person opposing intervention the burden of showing adequacy of
representation.71 In the absense of a stronger showing that this was
68 Dissenting in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386
U.S. 129, 155 (1967).69 See 4 MooRE fI24.08[2]. The annotation in 84 A.L.R.2d 1412, 1419-22
1962) sets out four differmt sets of categories that may enter into thL question:
1) to what degree are the interests of the applicant and the interests of he party
purportedly representing the applicant's interests, indentical or divergent? (2) who
is the counsel, how good is he, and what is his relationship with the applicant?
(3) how effective will the counsel's representation be in light of possible legal
disabilities to present claims of the applicant, or collusiveness, or strategy of
representation? (4) what alternative remedies is the applicant presently seeking
in order to represent his interest?70 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("That part of the
rule has not been amended"); Peterson v. United States, 41 F.R.D. 131 (Minn.
1966). See Coleman Capital Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 43 F.R.D. 407(S.D.N.Y. 1067) (surety does not adequately represent contractor because surety
cannot raise "personal" defenses).
However, previously them was no expressed requirement in the rule as to
inadequacy of representation where there was property in the control of the court.
See also Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1968):
Little guidance for the present case is furnished by the discussion in
the pre-amendment cases which focused on such inadequacy as collusion
between the parties, a conflict in position urged, or an indication that the
alleged representative would fail in his duty to prosecute the action
diligently. These factors have their most common and appropriate ap-
plication in class actions, where the applicant's interest is identical to that
of an existing party.
71Peterson v. United States, 41 F.R.D. 131 (Minn. 1966) (issue raised but
not resolved where in suit by executor-trustee for refund of estate tax based on
disallowance of a deduction for a charitable bequest to the trust's remainder-
men, the remaindermen were denied intervention on grounds that, although their
interests varied in kind and degree, the interests of the plaintiff and remaindermen
were not adverse and were both concerned in seeking recovery of the tax refund
for the trust; participation as amicus curiae granted).
Compare Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("While the
change in wording does not relate to any change in standard as such it under-
scores both the burden on those opposing intervention to show the adequacy of
the representation and the need for a liberal application in favor of permitting
intervention." Id. at 702), with Edmondson v. State of Nebraska ex rel Meyer, 383
F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1967) ("Inadequacy of representation is a necessary element
to be proved by a party seeking to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2)." Id. at 127).
In making the language conversion from an affirmative requirement that the
representation "is or may be inadequate" to the exception clause "unless the ...
(Continued on next page)
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the draftsmen's intent, the burden on the issue ought to be
placed, according to traditional considerations of policy and con-
venience,72 upon the applicant. At the same time, it can be argued
that the applicant should be the best judge of the adequacy of the
representation of his own interests. Thus in the absence of special
circumstances, 73 if an attorney has been able to convince the ap-
plicant that he should bear the expense of intervening, the court
should liberally find that the applicant has met his burden of
showing that the representation of his interest by someone else
may be inadequate.74
VI. INTERVENER'S POWER TO RAISE COUNTERCLAIMS,
CROSS-CLAIMS AND TO IMPLEAD
A. Where Jurisdiction Is Not In Issue
1. Counterclaims-Aside from the jurisdictional question,
where discretionary intervention is involved, some cases have
followed the old rule denying intervention unless the original
defendant has an interest in the counterclaim.75 But the better
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
interest is adequately represented," the words "may be" have been dropped. The
resulting meaning should, nevertheless, remain the same. That is if it is now shown
that the representation "r .y be inadequate," then this should preclude a findin
that the exception has been satisfied that "the interest is adequately represented.'
See Note, Federal Civil Procedure: Intervention of Right Granted Private Party in
Government Antitrust Under New Rule 24(a) (2), 1968 D=KE LJ. 117, 129.72 For a general exploration of these considerations in various contexts, see
Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L.
REv. 5 (1959).
73 See note 69 supra.
74 See note 71 supra. See also Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention bef ore
Courts, Agencies and Arbitrators, 81 HA~v. L. REv. 721, 740-48 (1968); cf. Cook
& Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HAtsv. L. REv.
385, 414-15 (1953). Under the Securities Exchange Act, the security holder has an
implied statutory right to intervene in a corporation's suit to recover insider pro-
fits when the corporation "shall fail diligently to prosecute." Cook and Feldman
urge the courts to grant liberal intervention in light of the legislative policy of
the Act, the difficulty in appraising the "diligence" of the corporation and its
counsel, and the opportunity of the court to limit the compensation of the inter-
vener's attorney if he makes no contribution to the case. Of course, the correlation
between attorney fees and claims of the right to intervene is difficult to appraise.
75 Equity Rule 37 provided that "intervention shall be in subordination to,
and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding." In addition, Equity
Rule 30, which dealt with counterclaims, was limited to the "defendant." Under
these two rules, the results of the decided cases were fairly restrictive against the
right of the intervener to raise counterclaims. 4 Moorm II 24.161], 24.1712]. Thus
in 1935, in Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtien & Kludge, Inc., 296 U.S. 53 (1935),
the Supreme Court held that the intervener could counterclaim only if the
original defendant bad an interest in the counterclaim. However, the deliberate
omission in 1938 from FED. R. Civ. P. 24 of the subordination provision of old
(Continued on next page)
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rule would give the judge the discretion to allow a counterclaim
even though the defendant is not interested in it so long as the
counterclaim was closely enough related to the transaction or sub-
ject matter of the law suit.
Under these modem principles, permissive intervention as
defendant has been denied the government where it attempted to
set up counterclaims on unrelated government contracts7G In
suits against the drivers of automobiles, passengers have been de-
nied permissive intervention as defendants when they wanted to
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Equity Rule 37, and the extension of the availability of counterclaims in new
FED. R. Civ. P. 13 to a "pleader," rather than a mere "defendant," support the
conclusion that the restrictive rule of the Chandler decision was overturned by the
1938 rules. See discussion by Judge Mathes in Hartley Pen Co. v. Lindy Pen Co.,
16 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Cal. 1954):
The limitation of former Equity Rule 37... was not carried into Rule
24 .... Nor did Rule 13 carry over the limitation of former Equity
Rule 30 that counterclaims, including those in the nature of crossbills,
should be available only to a defendant....
To be sure, the intervener still must take the main suit as he finds it...,
but only in the sense that he cannot change the issues framed between
the original parties, and must join subject to the proceedings that have
occurred prior to his intervention; he cannot unring the bell....
By amplifying Rule 24 to give the intervener equal standing as a party
to the litigation and by broadening Rule 13 to accord the privilege of
counterclaims and cross claims to all parties, the incidence of intervention
has been enlarged and the field of ancillary jurisdiction has been broad-
ened. Id. at 153.
But see caveat to this position by Judge Friendly, who states in New York
Central R. Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1961):
Whether or not the elimination of the subordination provision, along with
the difference in language in F.R.Civ.Proc. 13 as against Rule 30, would
call for a different decision on the precise issue presented in Chandler
& Price, [footnote omitted] the Supreme Court does not consider every-
thing said in that opinion to have been rendered obsolete by the new
Rule, as witness its statement 'As intervenor the United States was
limited to the field of litigation open to the original parties', accompanied
by a citation of Chandler & Price, in Columbia Gas & Electric Corp. v.
American Fuel & Power Co., 322 U.S. 379, 383, 64 S.Ct. 1068, 1071,
88 L.Ed. 1137 (1944). Id. at 949.
Cf. Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1965), where Judge Biggs in a school
desegregation case, denied jurisdiction as to original plaintiff taxpayers, but allowed
jurisdiction to be re-examined as to intervening plaintiff parents, and stated:
[A] court has discretion to treat the pleading of an intervenor as a
separate action in order that it might adjudicate the claims raised by the
intervenor. [citation omitted.] This discretionary procedure is properly
utilized in a case in which it appears that the intervenor has a separate
and independent basis for jurisdiction and in which failure to adjudicate
the claim will result only in unnecessary delay. Id. at 328-29.
76 H. K. Ferguson v. Nickel Processing Corp., 33 F.R.D. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
(plaintiff was subcontractor suing prime contractor who had been instructed to
withhold payment because the government had claims against the subcontractor
on other contracts).
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assert counterclaims for personal injury against the plaintiff7 7
Some of these cases are subject to criticism, however, for implying
that permissive intervention can never be used to assert an af-
firmative counterclaim in which the defendant is not interested,
even though the counterclaim arises out of the same general trans-
action as that asserted in the complaint.78 It would seem that,
consistent with rights under other Rules, the court should have
discretion to allow the permissive intervention if the purpose of
the intervention is either (1) to assert a claim which originally
could have been joined by the defendant and the intervener as
plaintiffs under Rule 20, or (2) to assert a claim, which but for
the non-joinder of the intervener, would have been a compul-
sory counterclaim under Rule 13 (a). The courts have come close
to supporting this proposition by allowing subsidiaries of de-
fendants charged with patent infringement to intervene to assert
factually related claims of patent infringement and unfair competi-
tion,79 by allowing the manufacturer who has already intervened
77 Kauffman v. Kebert, 16 F.R.D. 225 (W. D. Pa. 1954), aff'd per curiam,
219 F.2d 113 (8d Cir. 1955); Medd v. Westcott, 32 F.R.D. 25 (N.D. Iowa
1963); cf. Beard-Laney, Inc. v. Pressley, 18 F.R.D. 162 (W.D.S.C. 1955).78 The court in Kauffman v. Kebert, 16 F.R.D. 225 (W. D. Pa. 1954), arrives
at the result that the wife and son passengers of the defendant may not intervene
to join their counterclaims with that of the defendant father. Since the father was
being sued in Pennsylvania by an Ohio administrator, there was the substantial
possibility that the son and wife would have to pursue their claims in Ohio;
whereas if they could sue in Pennsylvania, the court concedes the actions would
p robably be consolidated with the suit against their father. In reaching this result,
te court states the following theory, which is quoted with approval in Medd v.
Westcott, 32 F.R.D. 25 (N. D. Iowa 1963):
It seems that the applicants here are seeking to shortcut a lawsuit. They
have no interest in the main suit, not being bound by the result thereof,
but it appears they desire to step aboard the present going lawsuit as a
matter of convenience in the trial of their own case for damages against
plaintiff. They have a right to bring a separate suit. This, however, should
not be confused with the right t3 intervene. Id. at 28.
See also Northern Ins. Co. v. Grone, 126 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Pa. 1954),
where the court, in sustaining the insurance company plaintiff's motion for
voluntary dismissal of its declaratory judgment action over the objection of the
intervener insurance company that its counterclaims were still pending, made the
unnecessarily broad statement: "I can find no authority in Rule 24 to grant an
intervenor affirmative relief." Id. at 458.79 Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Ele'. Corp., 325 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 944 (1964) (defendant parent owned 76% of stock
in Canadian subsidiary which in turned owned the patents which were subject of
the counterclaim). Cf. Distillers Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 10 FED. RUIs SEav. 2d
18a.21, Case 5 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (foreign subsidiary of defendant was permitted
to intervene in a patent infringement action against the parent for the purpose
of filing a counterclaim for unfair competition when defendant parent had been
allowed to fie a counterclaim which was closely related to the counterclaim of the
intervener; in this case, however, the parent perhaps had sufficient interest to
maintain the full counterclaim even without the intervention of its subsidiary).
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as defendant in patent litigation to assert anti-trust claims against
the plaintiff,80 and by allowing contractors, in suits against their
sureties, to intervene to assert related counterclaims against the
plaintiff.8 ' As Chief Judge Lumbard of the Second Circuit states:
The whole tenor and framework of the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure preclude application of a standard which strictly limits
the intervenor to those defenses and counterclaims which the
original defendant himself could have interposed. Where
there exists a sufficiently close relationship between the claims
and defenses of the intervenor and those of the original de-
fendant to permit adjudication of all claims in one forum and
in one suit without unnecessary delay-and to avoid as well
the delay and waste of judicial resources attendant upon re-
quiring separate trials-the district court is without discretion
to deny the intervenor the opportumity to advance such
claims.
* 0 * *
... [T] o whatever extent Chandler may look the other
way, the decision in that case was rendered prior to the
Supreme Court's enactment in 1938 of the Federal Rules. The
Rules, as we have indicated, were designed to permit the
speedy and inexpensive litigation of controversies and to maxi-
mize the expenditure of judicial resources wherever possible
... [Footnote omitted].... While it would be highly unde-
sirable to construe Rules 18 and 24 to permit a permissive
intervenor to interpose all permissive counterclaims-however
unrelated to the original litigation- [Rules 13, 14, 22, and
24] clearly manifest the spirit of modem federal procedure
not unduly to restrict the scope of litigation among parties
80 See Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 207 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954). Once the manufacturer had been permitted to
intervene, it was not important whether the intervention was as of right or
permissive, because he then had a right to file either a compulsory counterclaim
under 13(a) or a permissive counterclaim under 13(b). The court distinguished
Chandler, discussed at note 75 supra, on the grounds that here: (1) the anti-
trust counterclaim alleged an abuse of the patents sued upon by the plaintiff; (2)
the original defendants bad an interest in the counterclaim; (3) the original
complaint named the interveners as wrongdoers and sought injunctive relief
against them as being in privity; (4) the counterclaim was related to the subject
matter of the plaintiff's claim.81 United States v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 22 F.R.D. 248 (M.D. Pa. 1958)
(treating as a "typical case for permissive intervention" the entry of a contractor
to assert counterclaims against the defendantthird-Darty-plainti who had raised
a third party complaint against the contractor's sureties; here, however, it seemed
to be a case of intervention as of right, see United States ex rel. Foster Wheeler
Corp. v. American Surety Co., 25 F. Supp. 700 (E.D.N.Y. 1938), aff'd, 142 F.2d
726 (2d Cir. 1944), discussed in the text at note 94 infra.
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whenever consistent with a speedy and just determination
of the controversy.8 2
Where intervention is of right the court literally should have
no authority to strike out any counterclaims the intervener might
set up-assuming that jurisdiction exists-although it might order
separate trials.83 Professor Shapiro, however, takes a more qualified
view that the party who intervenes as of right is limited to raising
issues related to the basis for the intervention.8 Under this
qualified view, the intervener as of right should not be entitled to
assert permissive, unrelated counterclaims under Rule 13 (b).
Under either view the court should allow the intervener of right
to file a claim which would be in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim under 13 (a) .85
2. Cross-Claims-The principles applicable to counter-claims
as set out above should also apply to cross-claims raised by the
intervener. However, since Rule 13 (g) requires the cross-claim to
arise out of the transaction that is the subject matter of the
original action or of a counterclaim therein, the Rule does not
82 Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 827 (2d
Cir. 1963).8 3 FED. R. Crv. P. 42(b). If the counterclaim arose out of the same trans-
action or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim, the intervener would be required to
plead it; see FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a). See Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 207 F.2d
483 (7th Cir. 1953), and later decision in same case, Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Chicago
Cardboard Co., 252 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954).8 4 Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and
Arbitrators, 81 HAIv. L. REv. 721, 724 (1968).85 Professor Shapiro would reach this conclusion on the basis of the court's
discretion, however, and not on the basis of the intervener's right, see Shapiro
supra note 84. See Plitt v. Hofferbert, 125 F. Supp. 809 (D. Md. 1954) (federal
government may intervene in an income tax refund action against a former
Collector of Internal Revenue to assert a counterclaim for jeopardy tax assessments
for which the Collector could not sue), distinguishing H. K. Ferguson v. Nickel
Processing Corp., 33 F.R.D. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin,
207 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1953), cert denied. 347 U.S. 912 (1954); Stewart-Warner
Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 352 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 944 (1964); Lenz v. Wagner, 240 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1957) (in a tax
receivership initiated by the government, court had jurisdiction to grant a
deficiency judgment in favor of an intervening mortgagee-creditor against a
defendant on a theory that the intervention was of right, the claims were
compulsory under Rule 13(a), and jurisdiction was ancillary).
In Otis Elevator Co. v. Standard Constr. Co., 10 F.R.D. 404 (D. Minn. 1950),
Judge Nordbye found that a hospital presented a sufficient pleading to be allowed
intervention as principal in suit against its cntractor-agent in order to raise
counterclaims for deficient work by the plaintiff and stated:
That one who may intervene as a matter of right should be accorded
the right to assert a counterclaim related to the transactions upon which
the action is based is within the logic and intent of the Rules 24 and
13, which concern intervention and counterclaims, seems apparent. Id.
at 407.
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explicitly authorize a party who intervenes as of right to raise an
unrelated cross-claim.86 By implication Rule 13 does allow the
intervener to raise a related cross-claim.87
3. Third Party Claims-Rule 14, which provides for third-
party practice, speaks of the rights of a defendant and of a plaintiff
to implead a third person. If this be given the construction which
was given to Equity Rule 30, which used the word "defendant,"8
Rule 14 would not apply to interveners.8 9 However, where an
intervener is allowed to come in as a defendant or as a plaintiff,
there should now be no objection to allowing him to implead
under Rule 14.
Where a third party complaint has been filed by one of the
original defendants, an intervener may be allowed in as a third
party defendant. 0
B. Where Jurisdiction is in Issue
1. In General-If it is conceded that the court, under Rules
24 and 13 may allow a permissive intervener to raise counter-
86 3 MOORE ff13.34. Unlike the compulsory counterclaim, the cross-claim is
permissive in nature.
87 See Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967)
(in government suit to declare its exclusive ownership of a coral reef against one
claimant, second claimant had right to intervene as defendant to answer govern-
ment and to cross-claim against defendant for trespass); Hartley Pen Co. v. Lindy
Pen Co., Inc., 16 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (Kimberly had right to intervene
as co-plaintiff with Hartley to assert patent infringement claim against Lindy, but
Kimberly denied right to cross-claim against Hartley for patent infringement;
KImberly's claim denied on merits, sub nom. Kimberly Corp. v. Hartley Pen Co.,
237 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1956)).
Cf. Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1963) (where
Hartley sued DuPont for supplying defective dye, and DuPont moved for discovery
of secret formula being usedby Hartley under license from Formulabs, Formulabs
had right to intervene and to present cross-complaint against Hartley asking for
restraint against disclosure); Magdoff v. Saphin Television & Appliance, Inc., 228
F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1955) (in suit by seller against purchaser, sales agent was
granted permissive intervention to cross-claim for his commission against seller).
88 In United States ex rel. Foster Wheeler Corp. v. American Surety Co., 25
F. Supp. 700 (E.D.N.Y. 1938), aff'd, 142 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1944), discussed
in text, at note 88 infra, the district court permitted an intervening defendant to
file a third-party complaint, without commenting on this feature of the question.
The appellate court did not discuss the imp~ieader question, the third-party
defendant not having appealed.
89 Republic of Italy v. DeAngelis, 18 FED. Rur.LEs SEav. 24a.2, Case 2(S.D.N.Y. 1953) ("the court should not prevert Rule 24(b) to permit the entrance
of an intervenor who desires only to assert a claim against new parties when he
has no right to assert the claim under Rule 14 which does not include or apply
to intervenors.")
90 United States ex rel. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
22 F.R.D. 248 (M.D. Pa. 1958). Sub-sub contractor Automatic sued prime con-
tractor Merrit. Merrit filed third party complaint against surety of sub-contractor
Raff. Raff was allowed to intervene to assert counterclaim against Merrit in
circumstances where original suit had in the meantime been severed.
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claims, and generally must allow an intervener of right to counter-
claim, then the remaining issues are whether there is jurisdiction
over the counterclaim and appropriate venue. Certainly, if there
is independent jurisdiction to sustain the counterclaim, then,
even though the original action is dismissed, the court may retain
jurisdiction over the counterclaim and dispose of it on the merits.91
However, if there is no independent jurisdiction, various dis-
tinctions have been raised to justify rejection or reception of
ancillary or pendent jurisdiction over the counterclaim. Some of
the analytical distinctions which have been used are: (1) whether
the nature of the action is in rem,92 or in personam; (2) whether
the intervention is of right or permissive only; (3) whether the
nature of the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. The use
of these procedural distinctions is to be expected: the same factors
which give rise to them are similar to the pragmatic consider-
ations which give rise to doctrines of pendent and ancillary juris-
diction. 3
One of the first cases to arise involving Rules 24 and 13 was
United States to Use of Foster Wheeler Corp. v. American Surety
Co. 94 There, a party intervening as of right in an action against
its surety was permitted to set up a counterclaim against the plain-
tiff arising out of a breach of the same contract upon which the
plaintiff sued. While there would have been no federal jurisdiction
of an independent action by the intervener against the plaintiff,
91 See Magdoff v. Saphin Television & Appliance, Inc., 228 F.2d 214 (5th
Cir. 1955) (agent who has received permission to intervene and present an
independent claim for his commission against the plaintiff seller and the defendant
buyer may maintain claim against plaintiff even though the original action between
plaintiff and defendant buyer is dismissed); Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cir.
1965) quoted in note 75, supra.
Cf. Switzer Bros. v. Chicago Cardboard Co., 252 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1958)
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954) (although original patent claim was dismissed
because of absence of indispensable parties plaintiff, anti-trust counterclaims by
intervener against plaintiff could be adjudicated beca"Use of independent juris-
dictional grounds); see prior decision in same case, Switzer Bros. Inc. v. Locklin,
207 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954); cf. Dickinson
v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952). But see Northern Ins. Co. v. Grone,
126 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Pa. 1954).
92 On a class action, see note 115 infia.
93 See Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631 (3d
Cir. 1960); Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp.., 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944).
9425 F. Supp. 700 (E.D.N.Y. 1938), aff'd, 142 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1944).
Some of the facts occurred prior to the effective date of the Federal Rules. The
district court treated the Rules as applicable, but the appellate court assumed
that they were not, saying "Of course the propriety of such orders as these would
hardly have been questioned had they been made after the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure took effect. Rules 13(a) and 24(a), FRCP." Id. at 728.
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jurisdiction was found to exist because the plaintiff's action was
brought under a federal statute. Thus prior history and the
adoption of the Federal Rules might be said to have produced the
following jurisdictional rule for in personam actions: a counter-
claim based on intervention of right can be sustained on ancillary
jurisdiction, whereas a counterclaim based on permissive inter-
vention requires an independent jurisdictional base,9 5 unless it
arises in a class suit or in an in rem action.
The rule that intervention of right will sustain ancillary
jurisdiction had its origin in cases where there was property in the
custody of the federal court. Thus in diversity cases raising
multiple claims to property, it was a matter of compelling neces-
sity and efficiency that the federal court should allow claimants to
the property to intervene as of right without regard to their
citizenship.9 6 When the Federal Rules of 1938 explicitly recognized
the right of intervention in non-property cases, the ancillary
jurisdiction rule followed by implication. That is, even in non-
property cases, if the right to intervene can be called absolute in a
procedural sense, the label also carries with it the consequence
that ancillary jurisdiction can be sustained over the claim on
ancillary theories without requiring independent jurisdiction. 7
This principle then should carry over and be fully applicable to
all cases involving the absolute right to intervene under the 1966
version of Rule 24 (a) 98
95 In Hartley Pen Co. v. Lindy Pen Co., 16 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Cal. 1954),plaintiff brought suit against defendant for natent infringement. Intervener entered
the suit as a plaintiff under Rule 24(a)(2), claiming that it was the equitable
owner of the patent sued on. It attempted to assert a claim for atent infringementagainst plaintiff and two additional parties as well as against the original defendant.
The court held that because intervener s ights as owner would have to be
determined by state law, there was no independent "case arising" jurisdiction as to
any of these claims; that inasmuch as the claim against the original defendant was
ancillary to the main claim and intervention had been of right, the originaljurisdiction over the original claim warranted retention and disposition of this
aspect of the intervener's demands, provided amendment would be able to cure
a statute of limitations defect; but that the cross-claim against the original plaintiff
and the claims against the additional parties were not ancillary and therefore, there
being no independent basis of jurisdiction, must be dismissed. Intervener's retained
claim denied on merits, sub nom. Kimberly Corp. v. Hartley Pen Co., 237 F.2d
294 (9th Cir. 1956).
96 C. WRIGr, FEDmiAx COURTS § 9 (1963).97 Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960); Northeast Clackamas
County Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Continental Gas Co., 221 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1955);
Texas & N. 0. R.R. v. New Orleans, 22 F.R.D. 84 (E.D. La. 1958); of. Dery v.
Wyer, 265 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion).98 See Coleman Capital Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 43 F.R.D. 407
(Continued on next page)
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The application of this principle under Rule 24 leads to ap-
parent inconsistencies with the jurisdictional results under Rule
19. Assume that under Rule 19, one of the original parties to a
law suit moves either to add an absent party or to dismiss be-
cause of his absence. The traditional rule has been that if the non-
party is classified as indispensable, and his presence would defeat
the diversity jurisdiction of the court, then the court must dismiss
the action.9 9 However, if the non-party is categorized as merely
necessary, then the court will not add him if his presence will de-
feat diversity.100
These results under Rule 19 are partially reconciled with re-
sults under Rule 24 by pointing to those intervention cases which
first examine whether the intervener is really an indispensable
party. If he is an indispensable party and his original presence
would have destroyed diversity, then intervention should not be
allowed and the suit should be dismissed.1 1 Dismissal here is con-
sistent with Rule 19. But if the intervener is found not to have
been originally indispensable, then the intervention is allowed. 10 2
The granting of intervention in such a case leaves us with the
following anomaly. If one of the original parties is demanding the
presence of an absent necessary party whose presence would
destroy jurisdiction, the court will not allow joinder. However,
if entry into the case is initiated by the absent party through
a motion for intervention, the court will allow the intervention
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (in action against its surety, contractor had absolute right to
intervene and to raise compulsory counterclaims joining non-diverse parties
plaintiff).
99 1 MooRE W0.60[8.-5]; 3 MoonE 919.0-19.02, 19.19.
100 1 MoonE 110.60[8.-4]; 3 Moons 19.04[2].301 Chance v. County Bd. of School Trustees, 332 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1964);
Johnson v. Middleton, 175 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1949); Curtis v. American Book
Co., 187 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Charleston Nat'l Bank v. Oberreich, 34
F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Ky. 1940).
102 See Drumnwright v. Texas, 16 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1927), cert. denied,
274 U.S. 749 (1927) (non-diverse plaintiff dismissed from suit, and allowved re-
entry as intervener); Kozak v. Welts, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960); Northeast
Clackamas County Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 221 F.2d 329 (9th
Cir. 1955) (in diversity suit by Oregon Co-op. against Maryland surety on
performance bond, Oregon contractor was not indispensable to original suit and
could intervene to assert counterclaim); Texas & N.-O. R.R. v. New Orleans, 22
F.R.D. 84 (E.D. La. 1958) (in diversity suit by Texas R.R. against City of New
Orleans to interpret contract for use of railroad bridge, other Texas and Louisiana
bridge users were not indispensable parties plaintiff or defendant, and could
intervene as defendants). Cf. Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissent,
states that indemnitor can intervene as of right without independent jurisdiction).
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under ancillary theories of jurisdiction. 10 3 It appears then that the
jurisdictional result turns on whether the entry is initiated by one
of the original parties under Rule 19, or by the absent party
under Rule 24.104 The distinction seems difficult to rationalize
with jurisdiction or non-jurisdiction and leads to possible creation
of jurisdiction through intervention rather than joinder.105
The majority of recent cases continue to follow the principle
that where the right to intervene in an in personam action is dis-
cretionary, independent jurisdictional grounds must be shown.10 6
103 Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Cook Bros., Inc., 23 F.R.D. 269 (S.D. Ind. 1959)
(non-diverse subrogor of property damage claim could intervene as plaintiff in
action by subrogee to assert unsubrogated part of claim against defendant; note
the anomaly here that jurisdiction was thus sustained even though the defendant
had lost an earlier motion to force joinder of the subroger as an indispensable party
under Rule 19, and the court had previously ruled that the intervener was merely
necessary and thus was not involuntarily joinable where its presence would
defeat jurisdiction).
104 The anomaly is not complete, however, because even if an absent party
falls within the category of a "necessary" party under FED. R. Civ. P. 19, he will
still have to show that his interest is not adequately represented in order to be an
intervener of right under FED. R. Crv. P. 24.
See note 102 supra, cf. note 184 infra. At the same time it may be that
diversity and ancillary jurisdiction rules are incapable of really rational reconcili-
ation, apart from historical evolution, see C. Wsucnv, FEnAL CoUNTs § 9, 75
(1962).
105 See 4 Mooan ff24.18[31.
106 Beard-Laney, Inc. v. Pressley, 18 F.R.D. 162 (W.D.S.C. 1955) (auto
owner denied intervention as defendant to assert claim requiring addition of non-
diverse insurance company); Maryland ex. rel. Carnesdale v. Rolen, 124 F. Supp.
86 (D. Md. 1954) (automobile negligence suit; intervener-plaintiffs with same
citizenship as defendants denied intervention); Ruck v. Spray Cotton Mills, Inc.,
120 F. Supp. 944 (M.D.N.C. 1954) (North Carolina attorneys for Swiss plaintiff
denied intervention to claim against plaintiff and North Carolina defendant after
parties settled without knowledge of attorneys).
McCarthy v. Autocar Co., 21 FED. RuLES SEV. 24c.31, Case 2 (E.D. Pa.
1955), aff'd original order in 20 FED. RuLtxs SEnv. 24c.81, Case 4 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
Chief Judge Kirkpatrick gave the following rationale for denying intervention of
what were apparently additional non-diverse plaintiffs:
In summary-in cases where the intervenor is attempting to prosecute
or defeat the original cause of action, the courts are concerned with
whether or not there is jurisdiction of that original cause of action. In the
present case where the proposed intervenors are asserting an independent
cause of action, the court must concern itself with whether or not it has
jurisdiction of the intervenor's cause of action.
C. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun-Oil Co., 190 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952) (error to allow State of Texas to intervene in
diversity suit to establish title to oil lands since intervention was not authorized
under 24(a) and independent jurisdiction was lacking under 24(b); Hunt Tool
Co. v. Moore Inc., 212 F.2d 685. (5th Cir. 1954) (court agrees with rule but
holds settlement of original action and dismissal of non-diverse parties savesjurisdiction over claim presented by permissive intervention); Komlos v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 18 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (workman's compensation
carrier could not intervene to assert lien against non-diverse plaintiff, but court
would entertain petition to intervene as owner of plaintiff's claim).
See Mclntire v. Davis, 246 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ohio 1965). in which the
(Continued on next page)
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However, there are several cases which have taken a broader view
and have not required independent jurisdiction. 1°7 Judge Luongo
of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania summarized and adopted
this broader view in deciding that various sub-contractors did not
have to show independent jurisdiction to intervene as plaintiffs in
a fraud suit by the general contractor against the owners of a
building.08 In a later case, however, in response to criticism,10 9 he
retracted this view and returned to the prevailing rule that
independent jurisdiction is required for discretionary interven-
tion." 0
As shown by Judge Luongo's repentance, where it is con-
cluded that the intervention is permissive and the intervener's
claim requires an independent jurisdictional base, the federal
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
problem is considered as one under Rule 20 governing permissive joinder, and
subrogated insurer was thus denied intervention as plaintiff because insurer was
of the same citizenship as defendant.
'
0 7 Maryland v. Chevy Chase Transfer & Storage Co., 140 F. Supp. 801
(D. Md. 1956) (plaintiff's property damage subrogee with claim less thanjurisdictional amount allowed intervention despite settlement between parties);
Northeast Clackamas County Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 221 F.2d
329 (9th Cir. 1955).
108 Berman v. Herrick, 30 F.R.D. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1962). In summarizing this
view, Judge Luongo stated:
Such a requirement (of independent jurisdiction] would virtually elimi-
nate all distinction between Rule 24(b) (intervention) and Rule 42(a)
(consolidation). Considered in that light, Rule 24(b) would serve very
little purpose other than, perhaps, to effect some minor saving in fees
for service of process. We cannot ascribe such a limited purpose to the
rule makers in promulgating Rule 24(b).
We recognize that there is a great potential for abuse in the view
we have taken. It is possible that suits may be instituted whose real
purpose is to eliminate jurisdiction barriers for proposed intervenors
who might be the real parties in interest. But since intervention under
Rule 24(b) is committed to the court's discretion, the courts have the
power to control or eliminate such abuses wherever they are found to
exist. Id. at 12.
109 See Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Intervention-Jurisdiction Requirements, 48
IowA L. REv. 530 (1963).
110 Oliviei v. Adams, 11 FE. RuLEs SEnv.2d 20a.72, Case 3 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
Judge Luongo wrote the opinion of a special three judge panel which was estab-
lished to bring uniformity within the district pending a definitive ruling from the
court of appeals. The court refused to allow joinder of parents' claims in a suit on
behalf of a minor where the federal court's jurisdiction was based on the foreign
citizenship of the minor's guardian. The court retracted the view taken in Berman
v. Herrick, 30 F.R.D. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1962), re-adopted the view that there is no
pendent jurisdiction over such claims and that discretionary intervention under
Rule 24(b) requires independent jurisdiction. The result thus remains consistent
with the rules on permissive joinder of parties in diversity suits, 3A MooRE
120.05, 20.06 and with the rules on penilent jurisdiction, 3A MooRE 18.07.
The decision in effect holds to the view that reformation is the job of Congress
nd not the courts.
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courts have not been expansive with theories of pendent juris-
diction. Thus, the fact that the intervener's claim shares some
commonality with an original federal question does not always
mean that the intervener's claim will also have an independent
federal basis of jurisdiction to sustain it. For example: where the
original suit is in admiralty, there is no admiralty jurisdiction over
an intervener's claim on a non-maritime contract;"' where the
original action is a condemnation suit by the United States, there
is no jurisdiction over a claim by the subsequent grantee of the
property; 1 and where original suits are brought by the Secretary
of Labor, there is no jurisdiction over claims by an intervening
plaintiff," 3 or intervening defendants," 4 unless they could have
been parties in original suits.
Intervention in a class action by a member of the class need
not be supported by independent federal jurisdictional grounds.
This principle should apply even to class actions of the type that
would have been categorized as spurious class actions under former
Rule 23.11r
2. Venue-Assuming that the court can take jurisdiction over
the counterclaim, should the plaintiff be allowed to raise an
111 Isbrandtsen Co. v. S.S. Kokoh Maru, 263 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(seller of steel wire with non-maritime contract claim could not intervene in libel
brought by purchaser of wire against ocean carrier absent diversity).112 Toles v. United States, 371 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1967) (because of the
anti-assignment act, purchasers of land who purchased after entry upon the land
by government, were not permitted to intervene in suit to fix compensation; any
claim that the purchasers miight have against their grantors under a warranty was
an independent claim requiring a separate jurisdictional basis not present because
of want of diversity).
113 Stein v. Wirtz, 866 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
996 (1967) (since union member whose comulaint resulted in action by Secretary
of Labor to redress alleged infringement of member's right to run for union office
could not bring suit originally, there is no way for him to do so by intervention
after Secretary and union agreed to hold suit in abeyance).
114Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 374 (W.D. Ark. 1953) (milk haulers
not allowed to intervene to assert they were independent contractors and not
employees of defendant in FLSA injunction suit; participation as amii curiae
allowed).
115 See Amen v. Black, 234 F.2d 12 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 352 U.S.
888 (1956), remanded for dismissal per settlement agreement. 855 U.S. 600(1958); Dickinson v. Rinke, 11 FED. Ruins SEnv. 24c.31, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1948),
af'd sub nom, Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 875 (1952).
Contra, Keavy v. Anthony, 2 F.R.D. 19 (D.R.I. 1941). See Gentry v.
Hibernia Bank, 23 Fmn. Ru is SEav. 23a.53, Case 2 (N.C. Cal. 1956) (where
the same attorneys who represented the two Oregon plaintiffs, suing as class
representatives of California bank depositers, also represented the fifty-nine
California interveners, the court denied interventi6n, stating, "The so-called
interventions are only for the purpose of avoiding the jurisdictional barrier, and
not in the real spirit of intervention .... ).
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objection as to venue? It is submitted that since the intervening
defendant's counterclaim, whether compulsory or permissive, must
be closely related to the original suit in order to justify the inter-
vention, the plaintiff should not be allowed to object to venue.16
VII. OTHER PROCEDURAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
RIGHT TO INTERVENE
An amicus curiae is one who has the right to present argument
at the discretion of the court." 7 On the other hand, a party is
one who has full procedural rights in the litigation. The question
arises as to the wisdom and the power of the trial judge to provide
interveners with unique statuses ranging between the extremes of
amicus curiae and full party." 8
The traditional theory has been that if the petitioning party
has the right to intervene, then upon his admission, all the pro-
cedural rights of a party flow to the intervener. Thus, rights to
make motions, take discovery, present evidence, cross examine,
and to demand a jury trial theoretically accrue to the intervener
of right." 9 Of course if the intervention of right has not been
timely, and the court could therefore deny intervention altogether,
the court should be able to condition even intervention of right
upon the waiver of some of these procedural rights on the theory
that the intervener accrues to these rights only at the particular
stage of the litigation at which he enters and must be bound by the
proceedings to date. Similarly, where the intervention is permissive
only, even if timely, the court should have the power to condition
the entry upon waiver of some procedural rights which would
unduly lengthen the proceedings.
116 Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 825 F.2d 822 (2d
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 944 (1964) (plaintiff in patent infringement
suit could not object to venue for related patent and unfair competition counter-
claim raised by intervening subsidiary of defendant); followed in Distillers Co.
v. Standard Oil Co., 10 FE. RULEs Sanv.2d 18a.41, Case 5 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
117 Note, Amicus Curiae Participation-At the Court's Discretion, 55 Ky. L.J.
864 (1967).
118 Shapiro, supra note 84, at 752-56; see note 164 infra.
119 It might be argued that intervention is historically an equitable remedy
and that the intervener has no right to demand a jury trial, cf. note 122 infra,
but see Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 869 U.S. 469 (1962).
The Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 Amendment of Rule 24(a) indi-
cates that intervention of right is subject to court regulation:
An intervention of right under the amended rule may be subject to ap-
propriate conditions or restrictions responsive among other things to the
requirements of efficient conduct of the proceedings.
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Under proper circumstances, the defendant intervener's de-
mand for a jury trial may be denied by conditioning the interven-
tion upon his waiver of the right to jury trial. 120 Where an in-
surance company moves to intervene as subrogated plaintiff, the
court may limit the scope of intervention to exclude its appearance
before the jury.'2 ' It has been held that a party cannot demand a
jury trial as to claims of interveners who have been permitted to
come in to take the benefit of a judgment in a class suit where the
issues have been fully tried as between the original parties without
a jury.122
Another case shows, however, that once intervention has been
allowed, the original parties may not stipulate away the rights of
the intervener.123 Similarily, an order of dismissal against the
original plaintiff for its refusal to obey a discovery order, cannot
apply to an intervening plaintiff who has no control over the dis-
coverable documents. 24 The opportunity to use discovery weapons
may be one of the significant procedural consequences causing
dispute over the right to intervene in the first place.12
VIII. APPLICANT'S RIGHTS TO APPEAL
As a general rule, unless an order fits within one of the ex-
ceptions for interlocutory decisions, 2 a decision of a district court
120 United States ex rel. Brown & Bryan Lumber Co. v. Massachusetts Bond-
ing and Ins. Co., 303 F.2d 823 (3rd Cir. 1962) (counsel for original defendant
surety was also counsel for proposed intervener defendant contractor and was
guilty of dilatory tactics in holding his motion for intervention until case was
marked ready for trial).
121 Harris v. General Coach Works, 37 F.R.D. 343 (E.D. Mich. 1964)
(workmen's compensation carrier moving to intervene in employee's tort suit
against third party; decided by referral to Michigan practice).
122 Dickinson'v. Rinke, 11 FED. RuLEs SRv. 24c.31, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
The court said that "It would be preposterous to try the basic issues of this case
all over again," aff'd, (in opinion of Judge Clark) Dickinson v. Burnham, 197
F.2d 973, 981 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952), stating: "Left
only was the question of "cssentially supervisory jurisdiction over the distribution
among the class' of those entitled to the fund. ... Nor was there any right to a
july in the fixing of rights inter se in this device coming straight from equity."
123 Raylite Elec. Corp. v. Noma Elec. Corp., 170 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1948).
12°4 Societe Intenationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.C. Cir. 1953)
(dictum) (sit by Swiss holding comoany as plaintiff to recover seized property;intervention by stockholders as plaintiffs).
125 Cf. Note, The Real Party In Interest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing De-fendant's Interest in the Determination of Proper Parties Plaintiff, 55 CAL'. L.
REv. 1452 (1967) (emphasizing the discovery weapons available against persons
designated as "parties" as onnosed to "persons").
120 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1964).
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must be "final" in order to be appealable. 27 Under this standard,
it is clear that a district court order allowing intervention is not
a final order and is not appealable as such.128 It would appear that
the converse should also be true: that an order denying inter-
vention is appealable since it finally excludes the applicant from
participation in the litigation and is thus a final order as to him.
However, the cases do not support this conclusion. Rather, a
jurisdictional rule has arisen under which an order denying inter-
vention is appealable if intervention was a matter of right;129 but
if intervention is permissive only, the order denying intervention
is appealable only if the court has abused its discretion.130
Today, it is difficult to find a wholly consistent rationale for
this rule. One justification is that an order denying intervention
is not final and appealable when the applicant has open to him
other adequate means of protecting his right.131 This theory might
12728 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964). Generally an administrative order must also
be final to be appealable. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704(Supp. II, 1967).
328 Kris Petroleum, Ltd. v. Stoddard, 221 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1955); Otten
v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953), af'd per curiam, 229 F.2d
919 (2d Cir. 1956). But of. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ.,
Harris v. Gibson, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964)(in school desegregation case, involving injunction under the continuing jurisdiction
of the trial court, appellate court affirmed trial court's order of permissive inter-
vention on merits without discussion as to appealability when issue was emeshed
with other issues brought up for review).
129 Sam Fox Pub. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961); Sutphen Estates,
Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951). Mendenhall v. Allen, 346 F.2d 326(7th Cir. 1965); Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp., 333 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1964);
Reich v. Webb, 886 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1964); Degge v. City of Boulder, 336
F.2d (10th Cir. 1964); International Mortgage and Investment Corp. v. Von
Clemm, 301 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1962); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 308 F.2d 856 (3rd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 936 (1963);
Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960); In re Federal Facilities Realty
Trust, 220 F.2d 495 (7th Cir. 1955), revd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 267 (1951);
Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 220 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1955); Cuthill v.
Ortman-Miller Mach. Co., 216 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1954); Peckman v. Ronrico
Corp., 211 F.2d 727 (1st Cir. 1954).130 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 331 U.S. 519
(1947).
See Edmondson v. Nebraska ex rel Meyer, 383 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1967);Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1966); Fox v. Glickman Corp.,
355 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966); Mendenhall v.
Allen 346 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1965); Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp., 333 F.2d
502 (2d Cir. 1964); Flight Engineers' Intl Assn v. National Mediation Bd., 338
F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Rosenblum v. United States, 300 F.2d 843 (1st Cir.
1962). Schockett v. Bromley, 198 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1962); Pennington v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 239 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1956); Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d
915 (7th Cir. 1953).11 Kauffman v. Kebert, 219 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1955); Cameron v. President
and Fellows of Harvard College, 157 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1946); Cresta Blanca
Wine Co. v. Eastern Wine Corp., 143 F.2d 1012 (2d Cir. 1944).
[Vol. 57,
LET'S ALL JoiN IN
have been sufficient at an earlier stage when intervention of right
was generally equivalent to the absence of an alternative remedy,
and when, on the other hand, permissive intervention generally
covered situations where the petitioner had an alternative
remedy. 132 But with the modem expansion of intervention of
right into areas where the applicant has an alternative remedy,33
the theory becomes inadequate to explain the rule. 34 In any event,
the rule tends to be a fictional barrier insofar as it pretends to re-
strict appellate jurisdiction. Since the rule makes the initial
question of jurisdiction turn on the merits of the question being
raised, i.e., whether there was intervention of right or an abuse
of discretion, as a practical matter, the appellate court must
decide the merits whether it dismisses the appeal, 135 affirms, 138 or
13 2 See Credits Communication Co. v. United States, 177 U.S. 311 (1900);
Comment, Federal Practice: Appealability of an Order Denying Intervention, 11
OEmA. L. BEv. 80 (1958) (defining intervention of right in terms of the degree
of finality if the application for intervention is denied).
133 See Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp., 333 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1964).
There are other historical factors which tend to explain the rule. One factor
is that Equity Rule 37, which governed intervention prior to the Federal Rules,
made no distinction between intervention of right and permissive intervention,
See 4 MoonE fT 24.05, 24.07[l]. Further, sometimes state law, rather than Equity
Rule 37, applied under the Conformity Act, see 4 MooRE, 124.04. Another factor
is that where prior to the Federal Rules an allowance of an appeal by the trial
court was necessary to perfect an appeal, if the trial court retused to allow an
appeal, the remedy was to secure mandamus from the appellate court, 4 MooRE,
024.15; cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Bisantz Bros., Inc., 249 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1957)
(indicating that a discretionary order denying leave to intervene may be review-
able by mandamus).
See also the related theory in Bankruptcy proceedings that certain rulings
lie solely within the discretion of the trial court and are reviewable only for an
abuse of that discretion, 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 11124.38, 24.39, 24.40 (14th
ed. by Moore & Oglebay' 1968).
134 It is possible that the appellate courts' expansion of the absolute right to
intervene was a reaction to the narrow scope of appealability and reviewability of
denials of the permissive right to intervene. See Shapiro, Some Thoughts on
Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HAv. L. REv. 751
(1968).
135 See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 687-88(1961) ("IT]he controlling question on the issue of jurisdiction, the answer to
which also determines the merits of this appeal, is whether the appellants were
entitled to intervene in those proceedings as 'of right "; appeal dismissed in an
eleven page opinion).
13 See Fox v. Glickman Corp., 355 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1965) (affirming
denial of intervention)
("Levy appeals on the alternative grounds that he was entitled to intervene
of right, and that, if not, the denial of permissive intervention was an
abuse of discretion. No challenge to our appellate jurisdiction has been
made, and, for reasons stated in Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp., 333 F.2d
592 (2d Cir. 1964), we shall look to the merits of the appeal on the
assumption that this exists." Id. at 163.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960
(1966).
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reverses 37 the lower court's decision. The appropriate solution,
therefore, should be to treat all denials of intervention as final
orders, but to reverse only where there was intervention of right
or an abuse of discretion in denying permissive intervention. 13s
The appeal procedure that existed prior to 1937 has been
changed by the Federal Rules. 139 In the usual case where the ap-
peal is to a court of appeals, the applicant for intervention whose
petition has been denied files a notice of appeal, and further pro-
ceeds in accordance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure. 140 If the appellate court finds that intervention was
properly denied, it may either dismiss the appeal or affirm the
order on the merits; cases may be found where each course has
been taken. Whichever disposition is made, the practice has been
for the court to examine the record and not summarily to dismiss
the appeal.141
It has generally been the rule that if the appeal in the main
proceeding goes directly to the Supreme Court, an appeal from
an order denying intervention will also go to the Supreme
Court. 142 But in Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc. v. Ameri-
137 See Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp., 333 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1964), where
Judge Friendly states:
Where the sole ground urged for reversal of an order denying per-
missive intervention is abuse of the trial judge's discretion, we would be
reluctant to permit the fragmentation and delay that would result from
allowing such orders to be appealed, at least so long as the applicant
has other means of asserting his rights .... On the other band, it is
settled law that if an applicant is entitled to intervene as of right an
order denying intervention is appealable.... Since this makes appeala-
bility turn on the merits, it is not a very effective or useful limitation of
appellate jurisdiction; the propriety of the denial by the district judge
must be examined before the appellate court knows whether it hasjurisdiction, and the only consequence of the restriction on appealability
is that on finding the district judge was right, it will dismiss the appeal
rather than affirm .... Id. at 594.
138 Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and
Arbitrators, 81 HAv. L. REv. 751 (1968); Comment, Federal Practices: Appeala-
bility of an Order Denying Intervention, 11 OKLA. L. Rnv. 80 (1958). Professor
Shapiro also suggests that in order to blunt frivolous appeals, the trial and
appellate courts could continue the pre-trial proceedings, pending the appeal.
139 For prior practice, see 4 MoonE 124.15.
140 Effective July 1, 1968 replacing FED. R. Crv. P. 73-76. The Supreme
Court Rules govern the procedure on appeals to the Supreme Court, 5 BENDE'S
FEDERAL PRAC CE FonMs 1 (1967).
141 See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961); Fox
v. Glickman Corp., 355 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1965); Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp.,
333 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1964), quoted in note 137 supra.
14 2 Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961). See
Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965) (where proceedings were
(Continued on next page)
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can Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers,143 the Supreme
Court routed the appeal (from the order denying intervention)
to the Court of Appeals. In 1962, a group of television broad-
casters made application to the Southern District of New York
under an antitrust consent decree. They asked the court to order
the American Society of Composers and Authors (ASCAP) to
grant them a certain kind of license. The application was denied
on the grounds that the consent decree did not give them a right
to this type of license, and that since they were not parties, they
could not petition for a change in the consent decree.144 The ap-
plicants took simultaneous appeals, the first to the Supreme
Court,145 and the second to the Court of Appeals.146 The Supreme
Court dismissed the first appeal "for want of jurisdiction" without
further explanation.147 The Court of Appeals, dismissed the second
appeal, believing, according to the traditional rule, 48 that the
Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the applicants' ap-
peal, since it had jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments in
the main proceding. 49 But the applicants applied for certiorari,
and the Supreme Court summarily reversed and remanded to the
Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court explained:
The dismissal that we heretofore entered was based on our
unexpressed view that the appeal from an ancillary order of
this type was not within the Expediting Act. Direct appeals
to this Court are authorized by that Act only from final judge-
ments where the United States is a complainant. The purpose
of the Act is to expedite Litigation of 'great and general im-
portance' where the Government is the aggrieved party. See
36 Cong. Rec. 1979 (1908). The controversy which is disposed
of by the District Court's order is entirely between private
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
brought in courts of appeals to review and enforce orders of the National Labor
Relations Board, and the courts of appeals rejected unions' applications to inter-
vene, the applicants could petition the Supreme Court for certiorari to reverse
the denials of intervention under 28 U.S.C. § 254(1) (1964). providing that cases
in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by writ of certiorari granted upon the
petition of any "party" to any civil case.)
143 375 U.S. 39 (196>4), on rehearing, 375 U.S. 994 (1964).
144 United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
145 Under § 2 of the Expenditing Act (1903), 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 29 (1964), 49 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
146 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964).
147 371 U.S. 540 (1963).
148 Terminal R.R. Assn v. United States, 266 U.S. 17 (1924) (Supreme
Court bad jurisdiction over ruling on a collateral issue subsequent to the final
decree in an anti-trust suit).
149 317 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1963).
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parties and is outside the mainstream of the litigation in which
the Government is directly concerned. Compare Terminal
R. R. Assn. v. United States, 266 U.S. 17; Aluminum Co. of
America v. United States, 302 U.S. 230. In these circumstances,
and the order being final rather than interlocutory, we believe
that the appeal does lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The petition
is therefore granted and the judgment is reversed and the
cause remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration
on its merits. 50
On remand, the Court of Appeals found that the appeal was
timely,151 and affirmed the district court's denial of the application
on the merits.152 It should be noted that this case did not involve
a routine intervention but rather an application under the terms
of a specific consent decree. However, the analogy is very close.15 3
In future cases where the appeal in the main proceeding lies
directly to the Supreme Court,154 the argument may now be made
that the denial of intervention, while concededly a final order,
should be considered an ancillary order "outside the mainstream"
of the direct appeals statute, and thus should be appealed to the
Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.155
IX. APPRAISAL AND SUGGESTED CHANGES
A. Procedure
The mechanical provisions of Rule 24 (c) do not present great
150375 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1963). As indicated in the quote, the Supreme
Court first remanded for consideration on the merits. However, since the appeal
had been taken 58 days after entry of the order, there was thus an issue as to
whether the appeal was untimely as governed by the 80 day period for ordinary
appeals, or whether it was timely as within the 60 day period governing appeals
in suits in which the United States is a party. The Court therefore, on rehearing,
modified its remand to read "for further proceedings in conformity with this
opinion." 375 U.S. 994 (1964).
151 See this issue described in note 150 supra.
152 331 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1964).
153 With the parties arguing this analogy, the Court of Appeals originally
speculated that the Supreme Court's dismissal "for want of jurisdiction may
have been similar to an order denying intervention as of right and was therefore
an order dismissing the appeal, 317 F.2d 90, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1963).
154 It should be notedthat direct appeal to the Supreme Court in this cqse
lay under § 2 of the Expediting Act (190j), 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 29 (1964), 49 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), but the policy expressed by the Supreme
Court in Shenandoah should be equally applicable to other areas of direct appealjurisdiction. See note 150 supra.
155 Compare the Shenandoah case, 375 U.S. 39 (1964), with the El Paso
Natural Gas, case 386 U.S. 129 (1967), where direct appeal to the Supreme Court
was allowed, without discussion of Shenandoah, presumably because the United
States in El Paso was vigorously contesting the intervention.
[ o . 5 ,
Lr's ALL JoiN IN
difficulty, nor d: they show a need for change. However, one
theoretical question might be raised. Rule 24 (c) requires that the
motion for intervention "be accompanied by a pleading setting
forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." The
result is that the intervener must generally identify himself either
as a plaintiff or as a defendant in his pleading and proceed to
claim, answer, cross-claim, counterclaim, implead or reply. How-
ever, these traditional plaintiff-defendant pleadings are sometimes
a difficult straitjacket to impose upon the intervener whose claim
is basically opposed to both of the original parties. Perhaps Rule
24 (c) in the future might be amended to recognize that the
intervener can simply claim against one or both of the original
parties without choosing to categorize himself as a defendant or as
a plaintiff.150 However, such an amendment would be unwise with-
out correlating it to the rules on counterclaims, cross-claims and
party alignment. Further, past decisions under present Rule
24 (c) have alleviated most theoretical objection. For, as we have
seen, in disputes over adequacy of representation, where the inter-
vener's position is identical to a party already in the suit, the
courts have been lenient in delaying the requirement that the
intervener present a pleading.'57 In other three-way type disputes,
the concept "claim or defense" has been broad enough to include
whatever unique interest the intervener may wish to assert, even
though the intervener might have to choose whether to enter as
156 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(d), effective July 1, 1968, has
no requirement of a pleading and provides simply that a person who desires to
intervene in an agency review proceeding shall file a motion for leave to inter-
vene, and that "the motion shall contain a consice statement of the interest of
the moving party and the grounds upon which intervention is sought." Cf. 4
MooRE U12.02 n.1.
A good review of intervention in administrative review proceedings is con-
tained in Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965). Under Section
10(f) of the National Labor Relations Act, actions may be brought in the Court
of Appeals to review orders of the National Labor Relations Board. 61 Stat.
148, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964). The Supreme Court held that
the Act, though silent on the subject, must be read as intending to confer an
absolute right of intervention in the Court of Appeals on the party who was
successful in the proceeding before the Board. Chief Justice Warren, in giving
an extensive analysis of the reasons supporting intervention, grounded the decision
on the policv of avoiding multiple appeals. That is, if the successful party in the
proceeding before the Board were denied participation in the appellate review,
and the Court of Appeals were to reverse the Board's decision, the excluded party
might later be able to raise a subsequent appeal. Since the rationale of the
decision is based on the prevention of multiple appeals, the nile announced covers
all successful parties to the proceedings before the Board, whether they are
successful charged parties, or successful charging parties.
157 See note 20 supra.
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a plaintiff with a complaint and cross-claim, or as a defendant with
an answer, counterclaim and cross-claim.'5 s
B. The Power to Intervene
The main thrust of the 1966 amendments focused on Rules 19
and 23.159 Once their revision was accepted, the revision of Rule
24 was a necessary consequence. But there were also two specific
criticisms of old Rule 24: that its res judicata test was too rigid and
that its "property" dichotomy was irrelevant. Thus amended Rule
24 of 1966 reflects three themes: (1) the theory and language of
the Rule should be correlated with new Rules 19 and 23; (2)
there should be no artifical distinction between property and
non-property cases; (3) the basic test should be the degree to
which the intervener will be practically affected and not whether
he will be bound under doctrines of res judicata.
It is too early to evaluate the operation of the new Rule. How-
ever, a theoretical criticism may be raised that the amendment of
Rule 24 did not remain totally faithful to the revision theory of
new Rules 19 and 23.160 That theory is that the rules should ex-
press factors for decision rather than definitional categories.161 It
158 See note 87 supra.
159 See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure I, 81 HAIIv. L. REv. 356, 358-400
(1967).
160 But see, Note, The Litigant and The Absentee In Federal Mutliparty
Practice, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 531, 554-55 (1968), concluding that as between
FED. R. Clv. P. 19, 23, and 24, new FED. R. Civ. P. 24 comes closest to pro-
tecting the interest of absentees in an adequate, practical, and flexible manner.
161 The Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1966 Amendments of FED. R.
Crv. P. 19, 23, and 24 reflect this theme, cee Kaplan, supra note 159, at 364-71,
380-86; see also text, Part IV B, supra. The views of judge Jerome Frank may also
be appropriate here. In summing up his plea for realism in the supervision of the
trial judge, he states:
Let us revise many (perhaps not all) of the substantive legal rules
which are now worded in such a way that they create the illusion of
excluding all judicial discretion. Let us reword them so that they will
become on their face what in truth they now often are, i.e. but general
guides for trial judges in deciding specific law suits. The 'sovereignty' of
the trial judge, now largely concealed, would be acknowledged. An upper
court would have the power it now has on an appeal from a decision
involving a rule which now expressly confers discretion on the trial
judge; i.e. the upper court, in addition to correcting important procedural
errors, would reverse for any 'abuse' oz discretion.
I confess that, when I write down that tentative suggestion I grow
frightened, so strong in me is the traditional lawyer's attitude. J. FANK,
CoURTs ON Tm . 156 (1949).
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is submitted that further revision ought to follow the following
lines: 1
2
1. Distinctions between intervention of right and permissive
intervention are artifical and have led to a precedential tangle of
analytical distinctions. 163 The Rule ought to recognize simply that
intervention is in the discretion of the trial judge and ought to
elaborate the factors that he should weigh in making that decision.
Just as the 1966 amendment of Rule 24 abolished the artifical
dichotomy between property and non-property cases, a new re-
vision should rid us of the permissive-absolute distinction.
2. The apparent dilemma between total intervention and total
non-intervention should be broken by having the Rule explicitly
recognize the judge's creative power to grant intervention under
reasonable restrictions as to the procedural consequences of the
intervention. 1 4 At the same time, the judge should also have the
power, when he denies intervention, to impose reasonable condi-
tions upon the original parties either as to their representation of
the applicant's interest or as to the impact the decision will have
upon the interest of the absent applicant. Rules 19 and 23, and
Rule 42 already recognize these types of powers in the trial judges.
The same powers should explicitly be extended to intervention
cases.115
162 Professor Robert Shapiro has made an excellent analysis of new FED. R.
Civ. P. 24, and has drafted a specific proposal for its revision; Shapiro, supra note
138, at 761-63. The suggestions following in the text would substantially support
his proposed revision.
163 See Part III A, supra, describing different results that supposedly cor-
relate with the distinction: appealability, reviewability, ancillary jurisdiction, and
status as a party. It should also be noted that Equity Rule 37, which governed
intervention prior to the Federal Rules, made no distinction between inter-
vention of right and permissive intervention, 4 MooRE 1111 24.05, 24.07[11].
164 Professor Shagiro's proposed revision contains a paragraph entitled
"Limited Intervention. See Shapiro, supra note 138, at 762.
Consider also the new options of a member of a class under Rule 23(b) (3)
to (1) do nothing and be bound, (2) to exclude himself by opting out, or (3)
to enter an appearance through counsel." Professor Kaplan suggests that this
"special appearance" in option (3) is not the same as intervention under Rule
24, but that the significance may not be great since both the appearance and full
intervention should be subject to court limitation, Kaplan, supra note 159, at
392 n.137, at 403 n.178, and Shapiro, supra note 138, at 731 n.45.
165 Lederleitner & Nolan, Criteria For Intervention, 1967 U. IL. L.F. 299,
304. The authors urge that consolidation or severance presents the same question
as intervention or nonintervention and that the two areas must be developed on
a consistent basis. For one such basis, see Schwartz, Severance-A Means of
Minimizing the Role of Burden and Fxpense in Determining the Outcome of
Litigation, 20 V AD. L. REv. 1197 (1967). See also Note, The Litigant and the
Absentee in Federal Multiparty Practice, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 555, concluding that
(Continued on next page)
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3. All denials of intervention should be made final and ap-
pealable. Appealability and reviewability are now confused with a
welter of distinctions based on permissive and absolute interven-
tion. As a practical matter, despite this legal flack, the unsuc-
cessful applicant can receive some sort of review and thus cause
trial delay and appellate burden. The solution is to abolish the
distinction between permissive and absolute intervention, place
the decision in the discretion of the trial judge, make all denials
final, appealable orders, make the standard for appellate review
"abuse of discretion," and give the trial judge power to continue
pre-trial proceedings pending review.16
4. Where procedural convenience dictates that the inter-
vener's claim should be tried with the original controversy, then
modem theories of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction should be
used to sustain federal jurisdiction. Barriers that are thought to
exist here under Rule 82 are barriers that are sometimes based on
old procedural limitations.167 But, as they disappear, it should be
possible for the constitutional, congressional and judicial standards
of the past to be re-evaluated to yield results dictated by common
sense.168 Of course, since jurisdiction is ultimately a political
question, it is necessary for Congress to make the molar move-
ments, 169 but even with its failure to act, the judiciary should be
able to make some molecular progress. 70
5. The factors for the judge to consider in granting or denying
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
FED. R. Crv. P. 28 and 24 in the future must be made to provide greater pro-
tection of the practical interest of absentees, or that otherwise, court rulings will
continue to favor the absentee at the expense of the litigant.
'
66 See text, Part VIII, supra.
167 See discussion by Judge Clark in Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp., 144
F.2d 968, 978-74 (2d Cir. 1944).
168 Compare Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1938), relating pendent juris-
diction to analytical distinction between one or two causes of action, with United
Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), relating pendent jurisdiction to
practical considerations of judicial administration.
169 Such action might be founded on The American Law Institute's proposals
for revision of the Judicial Code to deal with the problem of multiparty, multi-jurisdiction litigation. These proposals are predicated upon the constitutional per-
missibility of 'minimal diversity as a jurisdictional base, see State Farm & Cas.
Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967). Professor Shapiro, supra note 138, at
764, proposes the following amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1832 (1964):
In the determination of jurisdiction with respect to any civil action
under this section, the citizenship or other status of any intervener shall
not be considered, if his intervention is properly regarded as part of the
same case or controversy as the original action.
170 It is unfortunate that existing doctrine was thought to require the
retraction of Judge Luongo's novel theories. See notes 108, 110 supra.
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intervention should be explicitly stated in the Rule. Present Rule
24 (a) and (b) articulate some of the factors, but only in an im-
plicit, historical way. These factors should be stated in terms of
the concrete referents around which modem party rules should
be built: (1) the interests of the intervener; (2) the interests of
the original parties; and, (3) the interests of the court in efficient
judicial administration. By focusing the attention of the judge on
such referents, the Rule should aid him in deciding whether it is
best to dispose of the whole controversy with intervention, to allow
multiplicity by denying intervention, or to compromise these two
extremes by creating limited intervention. Such factors would in-
clude:
(1) The nature of the applicant's interest.'7 '
(2) The representation of the applicant's interest by the
original parties and their attorneys. 172
(3) The effectiveness of the remedies the applicant will have
if intervention is deniedY.7 3
(4) The nature of the interest of the original parties.174
(5) The prejudice to the interests of the original parties if
intervention is allowed. 7 5
171 The identity and status of the applicant in relation to the substantive
law will define the interest of the applicant. It may be that the substantive law
will be interpreted to grant the applicant the absolute, unconditional right to
intervene as a matter of law without regard to the other factors subsequently
listed. On the other hand, the relevant substantive law may define the interest as
one which should be protected by intervention only if the other factors are
satisfied. In any event, the express inclusions in present FE. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (b)
of the absolute and conditional statutory rights to intervene are superfluous and
should be eliminated. Cf. criticism of a similar statutory provision of FED. R. Crv.
P. 17(a) in Atldnson, The Real Party In kiterest Rule: A Plea for Its Aboltion,
32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 926, 957-58 (1957), but see, Shapiro, supra note 138, at 757-
59, 761, proposing to retain express provision for statutory intervention.
172 Some of the considerations under this factor art; set out in note 69 supra.
Other considerations would be the interests and objectives of attorneys, see note3 supra.173 This factor is a restatement of the present requirement that the inter-
vener of right be "so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest." See Note, Federal
Civil Procedure: Intervention of Right Granted Private Party in Government Anti-
trust Suit Under New Rule 24(a)(2), 1968 DuE L.J. 117, 124 and text, Part
VI supra.
174 Again, the identity and status of the original parties in relation to the
relevant substantive law will define the nature of their interest. This factor of
necessity must be analyzed in conjunction with an analysis of the applicant's
interest, see factor number (1), note 171 supra.
175 This factor is a restatement of the provision in FED. RI. Crv. P. 24(b)
that the judge must consider "whether intervention will unduly delay or pre-judice the adjudication rights of the original parties." See 4 MooRE ff24.10[4].
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(6) The impact on the jurisdiction of the court if inter-
vention is allowed.176
(7) The time at which the application is made.177
(8) The impact on the fair and efficient administration of
justice if intervention is allowed or denied.178
(9) The possibility of making orders subjecting the applicant
to reasonable conditions if intervention is granted, or in
subjecting the original parties to reasonable conditions if
intervention is denied. 7 9
Some obvious shortcomings can be identified in the approach
outlined above:
(1) Eliminating the distinction between permissive and ab-
176 Where the presence of the applicant might defeat jurisdiction, or where
his claim might not lie within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, thejudge would justif-, or reject intervention in conjunction with the practical policies
supporting ancillary or pendent jurisdiction. Under this provision he would not
be invited to choose between intervention of right and permissive intervention in
a vacuum from the jurisdictional consequences, and would be urged to square his
decision with results under FaD. R. Crv. P. 18, 19, 20 and 23.
177 This factor is in part a restatement of the present requirement that all
motions for intervention be made "[u]pon timely application." However, in ad-
dition to this possibility of acting as a total bar to intervention, time should also
be expressly considered as one of the factors in defining the status of the inter-
vener if intervention is allowed. 4 MoonE f24.1311]. See also the possibility of
delaying intervention until the trial stage at which representation becomes
inadequate, notes 28, 74 supra.
178 The judge here could properly consider all relevant policies of judicial
administration as they relate to unique factors about the case before him, e.g., the
role of burden and expense in determining the outcome of litigation, Schwartz,
supra note 2; the advoidance of multiplicity, Kaufman v. Societe Internationale,
343 U.S. 156 (1952); non-interference with government litigation and settlement
process, note 28 supra; elimination of wasteful and dilatory appeal practice, note
38 supra; recognition of public interest in the litigation and promotion of public
confidence in the judicial system, note 46 supra; unified solution of controversy
consistent with efficiency and due process, text at note 48 supra; prevention of
strategic creation of inconsistency and confusion in judicial outcomes, note 63
supra; elimination of conflicts of interests in legal representation, note 69 supra;
regulation of attorney's fees in relation to real contribution to client and the
court, note 74 supra; maximization of judicial resources, text at note 82
supra; regulation of discovery devices, note 125 supra; prevention of fragmented
appellate review, note 137 supra; prevention of trial delay, note 138 supra;
channeling of appeals to appropriate courts, text at note 150 supra; prevention of
multiple appeals, note 156 supra.
Thus, the above factor should be read to incorporate the principle that FED.
R. Crv. P. 24(a) is not "a comprehensive inventory of the allowable instances for
intervention." Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 505
(1941).
17 9 The judge would be expressly authorized and encouraged to experiment
with discretionary devices evolved from experience with "big" cases and multi-
party, multi-issue litigation under other rules, e.g., class suits, consolidation.
severance, discovery, and pre-trial orders. See note 164 supra. and discussion of
administrative agency practice in Shapiro, supra note 138, at 752-56.
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solute intervention will unravel the correlative consequences of
that distinction, namely: appealability, reviewability, ancillary
jurisdiction and full status as a party. s0 This objection is
answered by pointing out that each correlative consequence should
be evaluated on the basis of its own rationale, and not on the
basis of a definitional distinction.
(2) A second objection is that eliminating absolute inter-
vention and placing all intervention in the discretion of the trial
judge may decrease the frequency of intervention in situations
where it ought to be increased. This fear is exaggerated.' 8 ' The dis-
cretion of the Equity and Admiralty courts was the original source
of intervention prior to any definition of a right to intervene. 8 2
Further any denial of present "right" would also be an "abuse of
discretion."1as
(3) A third criticism is that the creation of limited inter-
vention statutes will lead to difficulty in administering standards
of appealability and reviewability. For, if intervention is granted
on a restricted basis, there will still be a question whether the ap-
plicant should be able to appeal immediately on the ground that
his rights to intervene and participate fully have been denied. On
the other hand, if an appeal is not immediately granted, the
question still remains whether the creation of a restricted inter-
vention status by the judge will create a great potential for re-
versible error as an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. The
180 See text Part III A supra; see also note 184 infra, discussing distinction in
relation to res judicata and failure to intervene.
181 Recall, for example, Justice Black's position in International Shoe Co. 1.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 323-26 (1945). He feared that the replacement of
"doing business" with "fair play and substantial justice" would allow courts to
decrease foreign corporation's amenability to service of process. On the contrary,
subsequent judicial applications have allowed tremendous expansion of the con-
stitutional reach of state long-arm statutes. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm:
Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. L.F. 533; Homburger,
The Reach of New York's Long-Arm Statute: Today and Tomorrow, 15 BurFrFAo
L. REv. 61 (1965). See also justice Black's objections to the adoption of the
1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 383 U.S. 1081, 1032-
37 (1966).
182 4 Mooan 24.03.
183 See comments on Textile Workers Union v. The Allendale Co., 226 F.2d
765 (D.C. Cir. 1955), where the Court reversed a denial of intervention and
held intervention was a matter of right. One criticizes the result and adds that
the decision tends to make permissive intervention almost a matter of right. 24
OEO. W. L. Rv. 347, 350 (1956). The other agrees with the result, but says the
decision should have been based on permissive rather than absolute right. 41
VA. L. Inv. 1118, 1121 (1955). But see 4 Moorm ff24.15 at n.5 indicating re-
versals for abuse of discretion are rare.
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latter objection is answered by pointing to the many similar pro-
cedural rulings which ordinarily must be saved until the end of
the trial and must be reviewed under the general standard of abuse
of discretion.
(4) A fourth criticism is that the creation of a limited inter-
vention status will create problems for the application of due
process and res judicata doctrines. More precisely, the question
will arise whether a limited intervener will be bound as a party
to the litigation when his procedural rights to participate in the
litigation have not been fully recognized. This objection is in
part answered by asserting that res judicata is properly a question
for the second court to determine in the context of a subsequent
litigation and the changing concepts of due process of law.184
X. CONCLUSION
The evolution of intervention practice found its historical
bases in Roman law, civil law, ecclesiastical courts, admiralty,
184 1t is also interesting to note the possibility that a failure to intervene,
when a person had an opportunity to do so, may bind him to a judgment just as if
he had intervened as a party. However, in the past, at least as to permissive
intervention, "[tihe rule is general that persons who might have made themselves
parties to a litigation between strangers, but did not, are not bound by thejudgment." Gratiot State Bank v. Johnson, 249 U.S. 246, 249 (1919), discussed
in MOORE U.41918.-3]. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in a recent dictum,
raised the possibility that deliberate failure to intervene of right might bind the
person as if he had been a party. In Provident Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390
U.S. 102, 114 (1968), the Supreme Court reversed an appellate court for finding
that Dutcher was an absent, indispensable party under new FE. R. Civ. P. 19,
and stated:
If, as has happened, the three plaintiffs obtain a judgment against
the insurance company on the permission issue, Dutcher may still claim
that as a nonparty he is not estopped by that judgment from relitigating
the issue. At that point it might be argued that Dutcher should be bound
by the previous decision because, although technically a nonparty, he
had purposely bypassed an adequate opportunity to intervene. We do
not now decide whether such an argument would be correct under the
circumstances of this case. If, however, Dutcher is properly foreclosed by
his failure to intervene in the present litigation, then the joinder issue
considered in the Court of Appeals vanishes, for any rights of Dutcher's
have been lost by his own inaction.
If Dutcher is not foreclosed by his failure to intervene below, then
he is not 'bound' by the judgment in favor of the insurance company and,
in theory, he has not been harmed.
Consider also, the possible new evolution under Rule 19 allowing defendant
to force joinder of an additional plaintiff injured in the same accident as original
plaintiff, Davila Mendez v. Vatican Shrimp Co., 43 F.R.D. 294 (S.D. Tex 1967),
discussed in Semmel, Collaterial Estoppel. Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68
COL. L. R €. 1457, 1480-81 (1968). Professor Semmel concludes that emerging
(Continued on next page)
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equity, possessory legal actions, bankruptcy reorganizations, class
suits and administrative hearings. Modem problems of interven-
tion in judicial proceedings are now occurring in the context of
rapid changes in other areas of substantive and procedural law.
Thus the expansion of constitutional concepts of standing, the
lowering of political question barriers, the free use of the declara-
tory judgment, and the creation of new equitable remedies, all
tend to push the courts out of narrow judicial function molds into
broader legislative and administrative activity. At the same time,
this trend toward expanded remedial rights is evolving under a
national commitment to provide legal representation for funda-
mental individual interests previously ignored. On other fronts,
the increasing complexity and interlocking dependency of modem
transactions continues to supply the impetus for multiparty, multi-
issue court litigation in many new areas-areas which develop
rapidly before legislative regulation can delimit or delegate them
back to administrative processes. In this context, the 1966 amend-
ments of Rules 19, 23 and 24 emphasize the factors for the judge
to consider in joining all persons materially interested in litigation,
or in the alternative, the practical means by which he may protect
absent persons who are not joined. The result has been that the
private power of the initial parties' attorneys to control their law
suit under common law adversary assumptions has yielded to the
common good of all interested persons and the demands of
efficient judicial administration. This shift has placed more dis-
cretionary power in the trial judge to determine the appropriate
parties to the litigation and the terms under which their attorneys
will participate. In this context, the trend of decisions under
Rule 24 will emphasize the decisional factors common to all party
rules and their correlation to questions of intervention. Future
amendments of Rule 24 will hopefully continue to simplify and
unify these fundamental policies of efficiency and fairness.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
principles of res judicata should play a role in achieving the objective of modem
party rules to bring in all "persons materially interested in the subject of the
action."
1969]
